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Introduction
If two parties are about to enter into a contract and if one of the two parties in-
volved possesses some private information before the contract is actually signed, this
is referred to as precontractual asymmetric information. Informed individuals may
di¤er in their private information, specically, they may di¤er in their privately ob-
served type. Research on precontractual asymmetric information has been initiated
by the seminal papers of Akerlof (1970) on adverse selection and of Spence (1973) on
job market signaling. If the informed party nds means to reveal some information
about its privately observed type, this is referred to as signaling. The second impor-
tant approach to overcome precontractual asymmetric information is screening: the
uninformed party nds a way to distinguish or sort informed individuals according
to their type. The literature on screening was pioneered by Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976) and Wilson (1977).
Examples for precontractual asymmetric information are ubiquitous and can
be found in many markets, classic examples being the labour market, the insurance
market, and the used car market. Other examples include marriage markets and the
government-citizen relationship. Some developments in China that were reported
in recent years may be interpreted as arguably extreme attempts to overcome the
problem of asymmetric information in these two domains. For example, there were
reports about contestants on dating TV shows boasting about their fancy cars,
showing o¤ bank statements and about people being at ease in aunting their credit
score on dating proles and on social networks.1 Also, the Chinese government is
going to set up a national database integrating government information and data
collected by banks, e-commerce sites and social media taking advantage of the glut
of personal data collected through smartphones and online transactions.2 Based on
this comprehensive database the Chinese government plans to calculate a citizen
score to rate the trustworthiness of its citizens and to improve their behavior.
1See Yang (2010), Hatton (2015), and Hodson (2015).
2See Hodson (2015) and Hatton (2015).
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We have chosen these examples as they are related to the two domains which
we look at in this thesis. Specically, in this thesis we focus on screening as the
means to overcome precontractual asymmetric information in marriage markets and
in the government-citizen relationship as it regards to income tax compliance. In
the rst domain, screening refers to the situation of someone looking for a marriage
partner who may nd a strategy to sort potential partners according to the privately
observed resources each person could bring into the marriage. Finding a marriage
partner is not only a matter of love and a¤ection but evolutionary biology also
highlights the importance of the resource motive for mate selection (Trivers 1972).
Using economic modelling to describe how people choose a partner, how they seek
to address information asymmetries and to identify the key incentives involved is
therefore an interesting and important endeavor.
Regarding income tax compliance, the fact that it may require costly e¤ort on
the part of the government to determine a citizens tax liability and to also collect
the amount due has spurred much research in public nance.3 In this second domain
we focus on in this thesis, there may be asymmetric information as citizens have
private information about their income and the government may commit to certain
audit policies to a¤ect citizensincome reporting.
In both domains, we are particularly interested in the role of conspicuous or ob-
servable consumption. In marriage markets, the uninformed party, for example, may
ask potential partners to engage in a certain amount of conspicuous consumption. In
an income tax compliance game, the government may take observable consumption
into account when determining a taxpayers income type or when trying to target
potential tax evaders more e¤ectively.
The term conspicuous consumptionwas coined by Veblen (1899) to describe
the demonstration e¤ect of consumption that is undertaken to attain or keep status.
It is well established that in marriage markets conspicuous consumption serves as
a device to communicate and assess the desirability of potential partners.4 More
generally, conspicuous consumption may play a benecial role in the initiation of
social interactions.5 On the other hand, there may also be good reason to take a
negative stance on conspicuous consumption. It has been critiqued as impinging
on economic growth by reducing capital accumulation (Rae 1834) and as socially
wasteful due to the zero sum nature of the underlying status game (Hirsch 1976,
3For surveys on the tax compliance literature see Andreoni et al. (1998) and Slemrod and
Yitzhaki (2002).
4See, for example, Buss and Barnes (1986), De Fraja (2009), Dew and Price (2011), Schneider
(2011), and Griskevicius and Kenrick (2013).
5See Cole et al. (1995), Bagwell and Bernheim (1996), and Haucap (2001).
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Frank 1985a, Ireland 1994, Corneo and Jeanne 1997). We contribute to the literature
on asymmetric information and conspicuous consumption by studying a principal-
agent model in marriage markets in which conspicuous spending is a key instrument
to identify the attractiveness of a potential partner. Two features of our screening
model deserve special mentioning. Firstly, we take into account that conspicuous
consumption may not only be costly for the informed party, the agent, but also for
the uninformed party, the principal. This reects the importance of conspicuous
gift giving during courtship which, however, reduces the amount of wealth a partner
could bring into the marriage. Secondly, we allow for the principal to partially
observe the agents characteristics. In reality, one may have some information about
a potential partner, e.g., about his or her family background or (aristocratic) title
and these aspects may also be given a monetary equivalent.
Consumption of conspicuous goods, by nature, is consumption that is observable
to others, including not only social contacts and potential marriage partners but also
tax authorities. Consequently, e.g. regarding income tax compliance, tax authorities
may take signals of prosperity into account to single out tax evaders. Paying more
attention to taxpayersobservable consumption may provide tax authorities with
new means to detect evasion.6 And such policies may become particularly attractive
as privacy decreases such that more consumption becomes observable. However, in
the literature on optimal auditing there are few papers taking the role of observable
or conspicuous consumption for the governments auditing policy into account.7
We contribute to this literature by studying the incentives provided by two auditing
technologies which in di¤erent ways take advantage of taxpayersconsumption being
partially or fully observable.
Generally, to determine the overall welfare impact of tax auditing based on ob-
servable consumption and of a change in privacy, there are opposing e¤ects which
need to be taken into account. Taxpayers may dislike that some consumption is
observable. For one thing, it may increase the probability of tax evaders to be de-
tected. For another, taxpayers may forego utility by distorting their consumption
choice to alter their detection probability. At the same time, detecting or deterring
tax evasion may increase the resources the government can spend, for example, on
public goods.
In this thesis we focus on the theoretical treatment of tax compliance games in
which a government takes advantage of the observability of taxpayersconsumption
and we concentrate on the incentives provided by the governments audit policies.
6In recent years, tax authorities also started to use predictive analytics to better target potential
tax evaders (Cleary 2011, Hsu et al. 2015).
7See Levaggi and Menoncin (2015), Yaniv (2003, 2013) and Goerke (2013).
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However, we are well aware that such policies and data collection by governments
may raise concerns. Therefore taking a more encompassing perspective is in order
to briey discuss why observability of consumption and privacy, respectively, should
be judged with caution, even more so in the era of big data. In fact, ghting in-
come tax evasion by observing consumer behavior can be seen as a key example
for how big data can be used for the Common Good but at the same time can
trigger developments towards paternalism, extensive use of nudging and totalitari-
anism. If consumption data becomes readily available, some governments may nd
it attractive to award or punish citizens depending on whether their choices are in
line with government objectives, be it with respect to tax issues, health, savings
and investments or industrial policy. Technically, this becomes feasible as people
leave behind a constant stream of data created by their digital devices, allowing
articial intelligence systems to extract and compare peoples actual against some
target behavior.8 Already today, frequently usersprivate data is collected without
their consent and this data reveals what people think, feel and how they may be
manipulated.9
Moreover, if governments use consumption data not only sporadically but sys-
tematically for auditing or other purposes, this may result in a degree of surveillance
that citizens feel is restricting their freedom and creates a sense of intrusion. One
may object, however, that many people choose by themselves to actively provide
information about their consumption choices. First, analogously to the quantied
self movement, people use spending log apps to keep track of their budget. Sec-
ond, they may share information about purchases with their friends and followers
in social networks or they may even go shopping on Twitter and Facebook.10
Even more important than what people want others to read about them on social
networks is the data they produce using credit cards.11 There may be numerous
reasons why people use payment methods that allow others to keep track of their
purchases. Consumers may either be incentivized or simply nd it convenient to
use online shopping or mobile and other electronic payment methods. In China, for
example, customers may shift more of their shopping activity to Alibaba to improve
their rating in the credit scoring system Sesame Creditwhich uses data on a clients
past purchases and payment history. With a higher score, customers can then rent
cars and book hotel rooms without putting down a deposit.12
8See Hofstetter (2015).
9See Helbing (2015).
10See Olivarez-Giles (2014) and Greenberg (2015).
11See Pentland (2012).
12See Hodson (2015).
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Certainly, one may argue that it is generally consumersfree choice to share more
and more personal data for value o¤ered to them in return which may be hailed as
transforming so far inaccessible data into a liquid asset.13 However, many people
may misjudge or simply be unaware of how much can be learned about them based
on data collected by their smartphones and their transaction data.14
An example for the kind of analysis that can be done based on consumption data
is presented in Singh et al. (2013). The authors used mobile phone based data on
couplessocial interactions to predict spending patterns such as their tendency to
overspend. Whereas Singh et al. (2013) took several measures to ensure privacy of
participants and relied on receipts submitted by participants, they also predict that
far more spending data will become available electronically from spending log apps
or due to collaborations such as between Twitter and American Express. At the
same time, citizens may not be aware of how intertwined the physical and the digital
sphere are. This is why Helbing et al. (2015) in the Digital Manifeststress the
role of education in ensuring that citizens develop a responsible and critical attitude
towards digital technologies.
Even more important, Helbing et al. call for governments to provide for a reg-
ulatory framework to guarantee compatibility of technologies with democracy. Al-
though using data on citizensobservable consumption for auditing purposes may
serve the Common Good, governments taking advantage of big data may indeed
have to walk a thin line. Consequently, one may argue for a strong commitment
on the part of the government much like Odysseuss commitment when skirting the
land of the Sirens. Whereas data collection by private businesses is the focus of the
public debate in Switzerland where some have argued for embodying the control
over private data in the constitution15, this kind of commitment may also serve to
prevent excessive use of big data by governments.
The three chapters of this thesis apply principal-agent theory to analyze the role
of conspicuous and observable consumption, respectively, in two di¤erent domains
which we study independently of one another. Chapter 1 focusses on marriage
markets and Chapters 2 and 3 analyze income tax compliance games. Each chapter
13See Pentland (2012).
14Location sharing is a related example for this kind of unawareness. Based on a survey of the
challenges for privacy associated with massive data collection, Stopczynski et al. (2014) conclude
that users have a limited and often self-contradictory judgement of the policies and risks regarding
location sharing. The authors point out that, on the one hand, it seems that users do not mind
sharing their location but, on the other hand, when asked directly, they say they are concerned
about the Big-Brother e¤ect.
15See Flückiger (2016).
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of this thesis is based on a self-contained paper and can be read independently of
the others. In the following, we briey present the main results of each chapter.
Chapter 1 studies the role of conspicuous consumption in a courtship game in
which screening is used to identify an attractive marriage partner. Here, an attrac-
tive partner is someone who can bring su¢ cient resources into the marriage and
these resources, for example, may be required to raise children. The person engag-
ing in screening has only incomplete information about a candidates income. Part
of the candidates income is observable and some part is unobservable, and an old
moneycandidates observable income is higher compared to a Nouveau Riche
candidates observable income. To sort candidates based on their total wealth,
the uninformed party requires a candidate to show a certain level of conspicuous
spending. This wasteful conspicuous consumption may not only be costly for the
candidate but also for the person using this screening strategy as it reduces the
wealth of the potential partner. In the optimal contractual arrangement, the cost to
the person engaging in screening moderates the threshold value of the conspicuous
spending required for marriage. We also nd that the superior nancial background
of an old moneycandidate benets both the candidate and the uninformed party
by reducing wasteful consumption. Moreover, our analysis shows that the equilib-
rium pattern of conspicuous consumption is a¤ected by the marriage premium a
successful candidate would obtain.
Chapters 2 and 3 leave the domain of marriage markets and focus on the role
of observable consumption in income tax compliance games. In both chapters, we
follow the line of research on optimal auditing which assumes that the government
can commit itself to some audit policies before taxpayers le their income reports.
In the second chapter, we take into account that tax authorities may condition their
audit policy not only on reported income, but also on signals of prosperity con-
veyed by consumption of conspicuous goods such as luxury cars or yachts. Thus,
we analyze a tax compliance game in which the tax authority audits a taxpayers
income report with some probability and this probability may di¤er depending on
a taxpayers income report and his observable consumption. Taxpayers consume
a continuum of goods and some share of their consumption is observable. In par-
ticular, we are interested in how the audit probability set by the tax authority is
a¤ected if the share of observable consumption changes. We show that if there is
less privacy, i.e., consumption of more goods becomes observable, fewer audits are
required to induce truthful income reporting. Similarly, we nd that fewer audits
su¢ ce to implement honesty if an additional tax on conspicuous goods accompanied
by an appropriate lump-sum refund is introduced. When taxpayers di¤er only along
6
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one dimension, i.e., their privately observed income, tax evasion does not occur in
equilibrium. However, when we allow for unobserved heterogeneity in taxpayers
cost from being audited, some share of taxpayers may still evade income taxes in
equilibrium. Moreover, we nd that in this case less privacy benets tax evaders
because they are audited with a lower probability.
In Chapter 3, we consider a di¤erent auditing technology. With taxpayerscon-
sumption over a continuum of goods being observable, the government may gain a
clear indication of income tax evasion and may be able to induce tax honesty by us-
ing consumption auditing. The government announces to sample a certain number
of goods, i.e., it commits to inspect a specic number of goods which it later draws
randomly from the continuum of all goods a taxpayer consumes. Additionally, the
government announces a consumption level it expects to observe given a taxpayers
income report, and that it will treat the taxpayer as an evader if he is found devi-
ating from the announced consumption level. However, in the model we study in
this chapter, the consumption choice of a tax evader plays a key role for his actual
probability to be detected. This is due to the inspection technology the government
uses for its consumption auditing. Tax evaders may choose their consumption pat-
tern strategically knowing that this alters their probability to be detected by the
government. Specically, tax evaders may choose to distort their consumption over
some range of goods. Consequently, tax evaders are only detected if the government
happens to inspect goods in the range where they do not distort their consumption.
So, on the one hand, the government commits to inspect a certain number of goods
and tax evaders take this number as given, but, on the other hand, tax evaders
may choose a range over which they distort their consumption and in this way they
are able to a¤ect their actual probability to be detected. With two income types,
evading high-types may have an incentive to mimic low-typesconsumption over an
optimally chosen range of goods balancing the benet from reducing their detection
probability against the cost from distorting their own consumption choice. Nonethe-
less, in our framework with two income groups, we nd that a welfare maximizing
government may incentivize all taxpayers to le honest reports by committing to
inspect the smallest number of goods such that high-income earners at least weakly
prefer honest reporting.
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Chapter 1
Screening and Conspicuous
Consumption in Marriage Markets
This chapter is based on joint work with Kai A. Konrad and Amihai Glazer.1
1.1 Introduction
Courting Mrs. or Mr. Right is often costly. In the epic poem The Song of the
Nibelungs,courtship rules are straightforward and simply announced by the courted
lady named Brunhilde.2 She sets a threshold, marrying only a suitor who emerges
victorious in a ght with her. Suitors who fail may pay with their lives. Courtship
rules may now be less violent, but courting is still costly. Qualities such as beauty,
material wealth, earnings ability, and career prospects matter.3 Some qualities are
easily assessed, such as beauty and physical appearance. But the lifetime income
that a partner can bring into a marriage is, at least partially, private information.
Overcoming this information problem is costly. Suitors with high unobserved
lifetime income may simply wait until this information problem unravels later in
life. Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993) argue that such a delay may turn courtship into
1This chapter is based on an earlier version of Bronsert et al. (2017). The nal publication is
available at http://link.springer.com: Bronsert, Anne-Kathrin, Amihai Glazer, and Kai A. Konrad.
2017. Old money, the nouveaux riches and Brunhildes marriage strategy.Journal of Population
Economics, 30(1): 163186, doi:10.1007/s00148-016-0610-3.
2The character of Brunhilde (and the episode we allude to here) in The Song of the Nibelungs
di¤ers from a very similar character in Richard Wagners opera cycle The Ring of the Nibelung
or the Volsunga Saga. Therefore, depending on the mythology referred to, she may also be spelled
Brunhild, Brünnhilde, Brynhild or Prunhilt.
3Marriage may be about more than money, income, or wealth. The resource motive, however,
nds much support among evolutionary biologists (e.g., Trivers 1972). They emphasize the resource
capacity that the husband may bring into a marriage and which benets the couples o¤spring.
We follow this tradition, disregarding love and a¤ection as marriage motives for our analysis here.
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a waiting game in which men with low incomes marry early. This approach has
the drawback that prosperous suitors need to incur high waiting costs. Another
prominent feature of courtship is conspicuous consumption that is at least partially
wasteful, but may reveal information about expected lifetime earnings. A famous
example is the engagement ring (Ng 1987), but a proof of income may also involve
a Rolex watch, a Ferrari, a Hermès handbag, Cartier jewelry or other conspicuous
consumption products that the suitor displays or gives to the person he courts.4
We consider courtship as a simple mechanism design problem with one-sided in-
complete information.5 One partners quality is perfectly observed; this partner sets
a threshold to assess whether a potential applicant is su¢ ciently wealthy. A common
convention which was probably more applicable in the past is that sheis sought for
her beauty, which is directly observed, whereas a suitor has some unobserved income.
The convention has received support by sociobiological reasoning that combines two
aspects. The joint production of o¤spring is an important purpose of marriage (Ed-
lund 2006), and the resources required for raising children are particularly high for
humans, compared to other, even closely related species (Diamond 1993). For our
purpose the convention is not essential, and the gender assignment in our analysis is
only a language convention in what follows. One could even claim that, in modern
life, gender roles and the assignment of relevant qualities to gender are blurred and
have partially reversed. But what remains relevant in courtship is that the beauty
nds the wealthy, and that beauty is directly observable, whereas wealth is not.
The courtship framework we consider has several new and interesting features.
Spending by a suitor that reveals information about his wealth typically also hurts
the courted bride: such spending reduces the resources a suitor can otherwise con-
4The economic theory on status consumption highlights the instrumental role of conspicuous
consumption for attracting a better marriage partner. This instrumental aspect of status lies
behind many models of status-seeking. De Fraja (2009) explicitly links utility maximization to
the biological problem of tness maximization. A man faces a trade-o¤ between investing in his
survival, and conspicuous consumption that signals his quality and thus increases his matching
probability. Much of the theory emphasizes the role of status goods as signals of income (Bagwell
and Bernheim 1996; Corneo and Jeanne 1997b; Frank 1985a, 1985b; Ireland 1994, 1998, 2001;
Glazer and Konrad 1996; Moav and Neeman 2012) often with consideration of the role of the
income of potential grooms in the context of marriage matching.
5Matching, marriage and partnership is a complex issue with many aspects. For instance, men
may incur debt to provide a dishonest signal of their desirability as a mate (Gallup and Frederick
2010). Kruger (2008) nds that men who spend more than they save are likely to have more sex
partners compared to more frugal men. Conspicuous goods may signal not the desirable qualities of
a partner but rather the opposite: interest in status goods is triggered by feelings of powerlessness
(Rucker and Galinsky 2008, 2009) or a need to restore ones self-worth (Sivanathan and Pettit
2010). These and many other aspects are beyond the scope of the analysis here, which focuses on
one important information problem.
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tribute to the marriage.6 This cost needs to be taken into consideration when she
chooses the screening contract. As a result, she will typically require a threshold
level of conspicuous spending and will marry the suitor if conspicuous consumption
is of precisely this amount, but not higher.
Second, our approach can explain why conspicuous spending patterns di¤er
widely, even within the same society. Our model explains the observation that,
in contrast to people from an old moneybackground, the nouveaux richesaunt
luxury goods when it comes to marriage matching. Indeed, a suitor with old money
will be requested to spend less money conspicuously compared to a self-made man
who made it into the class of new moneybut has little observable wealth.7 Suitors
with old moneyenjoy major advantages: they need to spend less money conspicu-
ously, and they are acceptable to the courted woman even if their expected overall
quality is lower.
Third, an increase in the courted brides attractiveness can make the outcome
more wasteful. Separating suitors according to their wealth becomes more di¢ cult
for a potential bride who is particularly sought after (for example, because of her
beauty or personality or due to a highly male-biased sex ratio). Men of all incomes
may be willing to spend much money conspicuously, hurting the potential brides
aim to marry a man who brings large resources to the marriage.
Fourth, we can draw conclusions about the e¤ects of ageing. Finding a husband
or a spouse is a two-sided matching problem that may take many iterations and
many periods.8 Much of our analysis focuses on a static choice problem of two given
partners and the problem of incomplete information. We discuss, however, how
this partial problem can be embedded in a dynamic game. The analysis predicts
a negative correlation between the courted brides age and the level of conspicuous
consumption which she requires from a successful suitor.
Several papers relate to our analysis. This chapter may be seen as taking a
new perspective on the argument put forward in Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993), dis-
cussed above. We address the likely implications of Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993)
for our results in Section 1.5. Asymmetric information and a direct link between
status consumption and marriage markets is considered by Pesendorfer (1995). In
6Screening by Brunhilde for a strong husband, as in the epic poem The Song of the Nibelungs,
is also costly for Brunhilde if their ght dilutes his (and also her) strength, or if he or she gets hurt
while ghting.
7Whereas, in our model, conspicuous consumption declines with observable income, in Moav
and Neeman (2012) conspicuous consumption declines with observable human capital. They argue
that the poor and the nouveaux riches do not hold diplomas or professional titles and therefore
rely on conspicuous consumption to signal their success.
8See, e.g., Burdett and Coles (1997, 1999). Browning et al. (2014) provide a broad treatment
of family economics including matching theory.
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his model, wearing the latest fashion trends increases the probability of a match with
a high-quality partner. He aims to explain fashion trends, not marriage matching.
Our analysis relates to the large literature on conspicuous consumption and status
goods.9 Some contributions from this literature are particularly relevant. Bilancini
and Boncinelli (2013) address a matching model in which disclosure of information is
possible, but costly. Corneo and Jeanne (1997a, 1998) study aspects of the relation-
ship between relative standing preferences, conspicuous consumption and growth.
Their later paper considers matching and shows that conspicuous consumption can
improve matching. Truyts (2012) considers status signaling and taxation. Ander-
berg (2007) considers risk sharing and public provision of earnings insurance for the
formation and resolution of partnerships. Rainer (2008) considers gender discrimi-
nation in family bargaining. Thomas (2013) studies the role of the price for whether
a good is suitable for signaling status. Moav and Neeman (2012) also analyze in-
come signaling. We, like them, assume that individuals have di¤erent components
that determine their income. The observable component in their framework is hu-
man capital. Using an overlapping generations model, they endogenize the level of
information (i.e., human capital) which is available in addition to the signal via con-
spicuous consumption. Furthermore, our analysis relates to signaling models that
account for information on the senders type, which is available in addition to his
signal.10 We extend previous theoretical work in two ways: (1) the analysis of signals
that are costly both for the agent and for the principal, and (2) partial observability
(nancial assets or family background may be observable, but other characteristics
that also a¤ect a males income prospects are not).
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews some empirical
evidence. Section 1.3 presents the framework of the model and Section 1.4 derives
the brides sorting strategy in a static setting. Section 1.5 addresses dynamic impli-
cations. Section 1.6 discusses and concludes.
9Pioneering contributions include Veblen (1899), Rae (1834), Hirsch (1976) and Frank (1985b).
For surveys see McAdams (1992) and Truyts (2010).
10In Feltovich et al. (2002), apart from the endogenously chosen signal, the receiver observes
some noisy information about the sender. This extra information is unknown to the sender when
he chooses his signal. Equilibria are found in which medium types signal to distinguish themselves
from low types. In contrast, high types choose to countersignal, i.e., they do not signal as they are
condent that they will not be seen as low types. Fremling and Posner (1999) distinguish between
two components of status: one is a xed endowment, and a second is a¤ected by signaling. They
discuss how, within the same income class, individuals endowed with high status choose to signal
less compared to those individuals endowed with low status.
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1.2 Empirical evidence
Several elements of our model are supported by empirical evidence. These are (1)
the importance of wealth for male success in courtship, and the use of conspicu-
ous consumption to bridge information problems, (2) the role of beauty, and the
consequences of ageing in courtship.
In ancient Egypt courtship involved a suitor bringing his possessions in a bundle
to the house of his potential brides family (McDowell 2001). Work in evolutionary
psychology suggests that men are required to display their earnings capacity and
ability to support their o¤spring.11 Women considerably value intelligence, favor
men who grew up in wealthier neighborhoods (Fisman et al. 2006), and prefer men
with a good earning potential (Buss and Barnes 1986).12 Experimental evidence
indicates that men in a mating mindset are more likely to pay attention to status
goods (Janssens et al. 2011), and intend to buy more luxury products (and less
functional products). In China, much consumption of luxury products is reportedly
driven by conspicuous gift giving to second wives (Doctoro¤ 2011). Also, in 2010
government action curbed boasts of wealth in a popular Chinese dating TV show
(Yang 2010). Furthermore, empirical evidence highlights that ownership of conspic-
uous assets such as cars increases the probability of getting married. Using data
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, Schneider (2011) studies how
wealth a¤ects marriage. For men, both owning a vehicle and large nancial assets
increased the probability of rst-marriage entry. Likewise, Dew and Price (2011)
analyze the relationship between young adultsnancial assets and marital timing,
conducting prospective, longitudinal analyses. Financial assets did not mediate the
relationship between employment and the probability of marriage, but did predict
marriage. Higher car values were found to increase the probability of getting married
relative to the probability of beginning to cohabit.
These examples suggest that conspicuous spending matters for courtship success.
If the spending is made to fulll the courted partners expectations, this describes
the outcome of a screening problem. If no such expectations exist, the spending is
more in line with a signaling interpretation. Empirically it is di¢ cult to distinguish
whether conspicuous spending is made to fulll given expectations and conform with
11This has proven an evolutionarily benecial courtship strategy. For a comprehensive survey
of consumer behavior from an evolutionary perspective, see Griskevicius and Kenrick (2013), who
discuss so-called fundamental motives such as attaining status, and acquiring and keeping a mate.
Pan and Houser (2011) also summarize evidence from experimental economics and evolutionary
psychology explaining gender di¤erences in pro-social behavior.
12This nding is substantiated by a eld experiment on a Chinese online dating website where
women of all income levels visited proles of high-income males more often, and where womens
visits to these proles were an increasing function of their own income (Ong and Wang 2015).
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a given threshold of a courted bride, or whether it is a signal that is chosen, hoping
that it is appropriately interpreted by potential marriage partners.
Beauty as a factor in courtship is also well documented. To analyze the ef-
fect of looks on earnings, Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) use household surveys for
the United States and Canada taking advantage of how interviewers rated respon-
dents looks. They nd that womens looks were unrelated to their likelihood of
being married. Hamermesh and Biddle, however, give evidence that below-average-
looking women are disadvantaged in the labor market; they are also disadvantaged
in the marriage market, as they get married to men with lower earnings abilities.
In addition, Bereczkei et al. (1997) examine traits o¤ered and demanded in lonely
heart advertisements. Two of their ndings are particularly relevant to our analysis.
First, women who described themselves as physically attractive were more demand-
ing, that is, more likely to require traits such as wealthyand having private house
compared to women who did not describe themselves as physically attractive. Sec-
ond, the nancial and occupational status required in a new partner were increasing
in the physical attractiveness the women o¤ered. Similarly, a study of lonely heart
advertisements nds that female advertisers o¤ering physical attractiveness look for
a larger number of traits in a potential partner compared to women not o¤ering cues
of physical attractiveness (Waynforth and Dunbar 1995).
1.3 Assumptions
We consider two persons who think about whether to marry, and one-sided incom-
plete information about type. More specically, Brunhilde, the courted bride (player
Band shein what follows) is matched with a partner (he, or the suitorin what
follows) who wants to marry her. The characteristics of B are common knowledge.
But the suitor has private information about his characteristics. He has two sources
of (lifetime) income. The suitors total income is
Y = YO + YU . (1.1)
The income component YO (O for observed) is a given non-negative number and
common knowledge. The income component YU (U for unobserved) is drawn inde-
pendently from a uniform distribution on the unit interval [0; 1]. The suitor knows
YU whereas B does not; B knows the distribution from which YU is drawn.
The suitor can spend any amount c  0 of his total income Y on conspicuous
spending. This spending is observed by B. The remainder Y   c  0 is referred to
as genuinespending which B does not observe unless she marries the suitor. B is
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the principaland acts prior to the suitor. She will marry the suitor if and only if
he displays a status spending c from inside a chosen setM of possible values of c.13
The suitor observes this o¤er and then chooses c. They marry if and only if c 2M.
This ends the game.
A discussion of some assumptions is useful. Outside the model, the realizations
of personsincomes emerge only over time. At the point of the marriage decision,
the suitor has private information about the expected present value of this income.
Only some characteristics, including aristocratic title, connectedness, a good fam-
ily background, etc. can be observed. The static model maps this in a simplied
fashion: the observed characteristics are mapped by observable income YO. The
privately known income characteristics of the suitor unobserved by B are described
by YU . The sum of these constitute his total income. One may ask why the suitor
does not use Y and purchase a durable observable investment good. Taking the
static model too literally, this would be a natural solution. However, interpreting
YO and YU as present values also explains why the suitor cannot costlessly overcome
the information problem by turning his whole income Y into observable durable
investment goods. As YU + YO stands for lifetime income that has not materialized
yet, this is not an option. Practically speaking, the allocation of spending of what
is available around marriage age must be used for resolving the information prob-
lem. As discussed by Frank (1985a) in a related context, this will imply that the
person uses excessive conspicuous consumption in the present. This choice distorts
intertemporal consumption choices, and a given amount of conspicuous consumption
early in life is more costly the lower the lifetime income of a person. Later sections
analyze other dynamic aspects of the marriage problem.
Turn next to payo¤s. We denote the payo¤ of the suitor who chooses c as
(Y; c) =
(
a+ Y   c
Y
if he marries B
Y   c
Y
if he courts but does not marry.
(1.2)
Here a is the payo¤ equivalent of the non-monetary benet of marriage to B.14 We
assume that the suitor under consideration has a > 0, ensuring that, ceteris paribus,
13In a face-to face interaction with a suitor she may communicate this reaction in a slightly
more subtle way. Depending, however, on the culture, and also thinking of online dating platforms
and TV shows, she may indeed be explicit about the contract.
14The non-material benet from marriage is given, common knowledge, and identical for all
suitors. It is also una¤ected by their income. Experimental evidence, however, nds that men
primed with a large sum of money adjust their mating strategy; that is, they increase their dating
requirements particularly for physical attractiveness (Yong and Li, 2012). Similarly, evidence
from lonely heart advertisements suggests that men with more resources make higher demands
about physical attractiveness (Bereczkei et al. 1997; Waynforth and Dunbar 1995). Candidates
who di¤er in income should therefore also di¤er in their preference for B. If B can freely observe
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he wants to marry B. In addition, this a does not dominate all other considerations;
formally we require that
a 2

0;
1
2

, (1.3)
where  2 (0; 1]; the interpretation of  and the signicance of this condition are
explained further below. Further, we assume a specic parametric form of the cost
of conspicuous spending.
His payo¤ is linear in income, but there is a cost of spending c on conspicuous
goods, and this cost is equal to c
Y
.15 Conspicuous spending c distorts the suitors
allocation choices. The cost of distortion increases with spending c and declines
in his total income Y . Intuitively, buying a Ferrari for conspicuous consumption
purposes distorts the consumption decisions of a high-income earner by less than
those of a low-income earner. The parametric form c
Y
chosen is just an analytically
convenient way to describe that a given level of conspicuous spending is less costly
(e.g., in terms of consumption distortions) for players who have a higher overall
budget Y . Lastly, a rejected suitor still engaged in conspicuous spending does not
get a. This default payo¤may, but need not, be thought of as the utility of remaining
single and consuming his income on his own.
Bs objective function is
w(Y; c) =
(
Y   c if marrying the suitor
v if not marrying this suitor.
(1.4)
If B rejects the suitor, she receives her default utility v. This utility may be deter-
mined, for instance, by the distribution of qualities of future suitors, by the frequency
of further matches, and by her rate of time preference. For the moment, assume
that v is exogenous. If they marry, she gets Y   c. She wants a husband who adds
much to family wealth.16 Thus, conspicuous spending c may also benet B, but at
a discount, where  2 (0; 1] is an exogenous constant measuring the spending share
that is lost.
Conspicuous consumption does not perfectly reveal YU . The cost of conspicuous
spending is borne here by both players if they marry, and borne only by the suitor
a, the heterogeneity does not invalidate the analysis here. Relaxing these assumptions leads to a
two-sided search and screening problem that we leave for future research.
15Broom and Ruxton (2011) also assume this cost function in a signaling game involving evo-
lutionary biology.
16Several motives can drive this preference. B may simply enjoy consumption. Another impor-
tant motive that is prominent in much of the literature on marriage (see, e.g., Edlund 2006 for a
review) is the desire to provide resources for raising children.
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if they do not. B su¤ers from the suitors conspicuous spending, because it reduces
what is left for the couple if they marry.17
1.4 Analysis
Before analyzing the equilibrium, consider the welfare benchmark. As in much of the
status literature (Frank 1985a, Ireland 1994, Corneo and Jeanne 1997b) conspicuous
spending is costly here. It imposes a cost c=Y on the suitor, and a cost c on B
if she marries. Hence, for given marriage decisions as functions of Y , the complete
information rst-best benchmark has conspicuous consumption of zero.18
1.4.1 Bs optimal strategy
Bs choice is the value of c, having seen YO, but not knowing YU . Intuitively, the
higher the value of c, the less likely is the suitor who presents himself to B to have
spent c, and so the less likely B will marry. But if she does marry, the expected
income of the suitor will increase with c. Lastly, a large c reduces Bs utility from
marrying the suitor because of the waste involved in his conspicuous spending. We
shall focus on an internal solution, in which B marries the suitor if and only if he
chose c on conspicuous spending, and in which suitors with su¢ ciently high income
spend that amount. Later we shall also discuss corner solutions.
A suitor with unobservable income YU and observable income YO is indi¤erent
between spending c and spending nothing if a+ YO + YU   c=(YU + YO) = YU + YO,
or if YU = (1=a)(c   aYO). If B marries a suitor with observable income YO who
spent c on the conspicuous good, then the suitors unobserved income lies between
(1=a)(c aYO) and 1; the expected income of such a suitor is YO+(c+a(1 YO))=(2a).
17For  > 0, B dislikes the successful suitors spending and would like to keep it low, because
it reduces what is left for the couple if they marry. A successful suitors income becomes the
joint consumption of the married couple; one interpretation is that these resources are used to
raise children and children are a pure public good for them. In a more general consideration, a
suitors present value of income may yield a higher or lower utility to him if he marries than if he
does not marry. The assumption that c has the same e¤ect on his utility is mainly for notational
convenience. This income net of conspicuous spending also a¤ects Bs utility, and it may do so
either more strongly or less strongly. Though we assume that the monetary amount a¤ects Bs
payo¤ directly, the results do not change if Bs payo¤ is scaled by a positive factor. The analysis
also includes the two extreme cases where B also bears the full screening costs ( = 1) and where
B bears no screening costs at all ( = 0). In this latter case, the problem reduces to a standard
problem.
18Welfare considerations for alternative marriage decisions as functions of Y are less straight-
forward. We assume that income Y becomes a public good in a marriage. So the welfare e¤ects
of marriage for the two players in question depend on their reservation utilities, in particular, on
whether these entail marrying someone else or staying single.
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Bs expected utility from marrying such a suitor is YO+(c+a(1 YO))=(2a) c. The
probability that the suitor will have income of at least YO+YU is 1  (1=a)(c aYO).
Bs expected utility is
c  aYO
a
v +

1  c  aYO
a

(YO + (c+ a(1  YO))=(2a)  c): (1.5)
The rst-order condition for a maximum is
ĉ =
a(a(YO + 1)  v)
2a   1 : (1.6)
Substituting ĉ into Bs expected utility for a given c yields her expected utility
EU = (
v   a(YO + 1)
1  2a   YO)v +
(YO + 1)
2
2
  1
2
(
v   a(YO + 1)
1  2a )
2
 av   a(YO + 1)
1  2a (YO + 1 
v   a(YO + 1)
1  2a ): (1.7)
We must also check for a corner solution, in which B does not screen, but instead
marries a suitor with observable income YO if and only if he spends nothing on the
conspicuous good. With no such screening, Bs expected utility is YO + 1=2.
To characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, in line with the above intuition,
we dene four combinations (v; YO) of Bs reservation utility v and the suitors
observed income YO.
 (H1(YO); YO) is the set of non-negative combinations (v; YO) such that v =
(YO + 1)(1  a).
 (H2(YO); YO) is the set of non-negative combinations (v; YO) such that v =
YO +
1
2
.
 (H3(YO); YO) is the set of non-negative combinations (v; YO) such that v =
YO(1  a) + a.
 (H4(YO); YO) as the set of non-negative combinations (v; YO) that are implicit
solutions to
(v a(YO+1)
1 2a   YO)v +
(YO+1)
2
2
  1
2
(v a(YO+1)
1 2a )
2
 av a(YO+1)
1 2a (YO + 1 
v a(YO+1)
1 2a ) = YO +
1
2
(1.8)
in the range for YO 2 [0; 1 2a2a ].
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1.4.2 The main result
These denitions are crucial for the characterization of the equilibrium, and their
intuitive meanings will become clear in the proof of the main proposition which we
state now.
Proposition 1.1 Consider the full space of non-negative combinations (v; YO). The
following behavior constitutes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium: (i) B requests c = 0,
the suitor chooses c = 0 and B accepts the suitor for v < minfH4(YO); YO + 12g (ii)
B rejects the suitor (for any c) for v > maxfH1(YO); H2(YO)g. The suitor chooses
c = 0. (iii) B accepts the suitor if and only if the suitor chooses
c = a
v   a(YO + 1)
1  2a  ĉ (1.9)
for v 2 [H4(YO); H2(YO)] for the range YO 2 [0; 1 2a2a ]. In this case the suitor chooses
c = 0 if Y < ĉ
a
and c = ĉ if Y  ĉ
a
.
Proof. Suppose B accepts the suitor if and only if c 2 M for a given setM. We
rst consider the choice of a suitor with income Y = YO + YU . The consumption
choice c 2M yields him a payo¤
Y   c
Y
+ a.
The consumption choice c =2M yields him a payo¤
Y   c
Y
.
Among all c =2 M the payo¤ maximizing choice is c = 0. Among all c 2 M
the payo¤ maximizing choice is the smallest feasible element c 2 M. Denote this
smallest consumption level by ĉ. The choice between c = 0 and c = ĉ depends on
Y . Dene
Y (ĉ) =
ĉ
a
. (1.10)
It is easy to conrm that the suitor chooses c = 0 if Y < Y (ĉ) and c = ĉ if Y  Y (ĉ).
Note also that Y 0(ĉ) = 1=a > 0 and Y 00(ĉ) = 0.
Turn now to Bs choice. She can reject all suitors (formally, she can require an
impossible ĉ > YO +1). This yields her a payo¤w? = v. She can accept all suitors,
in which case the sequentially rational behavior of the suitors leads to ĉ = 0. This
yields her the expected benet w1 = YO + E [YU ] = YO + 12 . Lastly, she can choose
ĉ to apply a mechanism that makes positive shares of suitors self-select into c = 0
18
Screening and Conspicuous Consumption in Marriage Markets
and into c = ĉ. As follows by the sequentially rational behavior of suitors, such a
selection mechanism is characterized by a critical ĉ 2 [YO; YO + 1] and maximizes
wĉ = (Y (ĉ)  YO)v +
Z YO+1
Y (ĉ)
(z   ĉ)dz
= (Y   YO)v + (
(YO + 1)
2   Y 2
2
)  aY (YO + 1  Y )
by a choice of Y , making use of ĉ = aY (ĉ). The rst term in the rst line says that
Bs payo¤ equals v with the probability that Y < Y (ĉ). The second line calculates
the integral using the distribution assumption about YU . The rst-order condition
for a local maximum of wĉ is
@wĉ
@Y
= v   Y + 2aY   aYO   a = 0: (1.11)
Using (1.10), this is equivalent to (1.9). Note further that
@2wĉ
(@Y )2
=  (1  2a). (1.12)
Hence, the payo¤wĉ is concave in Y for a  1=(2). This is where (1.3) is used. The
solution for (1.11) makes sense only for feasible Y (ĉ) = ĉ
a
2 [YO; YO + 1] requiring
v a(YO+1)
1 2a > YO and
v a(YO+1)
1 2a < YO + 1, which can be transformed into v 2
[(1   a)YO + a; (YO + 1)(1   a)]. For v smaller than the lower limit of this
interval, B prefers to admit all suitors with this YO unconditionally; for v larger
than the upper limit she prefers to reject all suitors with this YO. Note that the
lower limit corresponds to H3(YO) and the upper limit corresponds to H1(YO).
So far, we characterized the optimal separating contract under the condition that
it is optimal for B to set a positive, but not prohibitive, threshold ĉ. Recall that
B has three potentially optimal actions: outright reject (M = ?), outright accept
with ĉ = 0, and the best non-trivial contract o¤er with ĉ. The maximal payo¤s for
these three actions are given by
w?(v; YO) = v, (1.13)
w1(v; YO) = YO +
1
2
,
wĉ(v; YO) = max
Y 2[YO;YO+1]

(Y   YO)v +
Z YO+1
Y
(z   Y a)dz

.
We can now study Bs optimal choice as a function of YO and v . The following
Figure 1.1 helps to sort out matters.
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Figure 1.1: Bs strategy for a given YO
Outright rejection versus a separating contract: Rejecting the suitor with ob-
served income component YO independent of his conspicuous consumption is supe-
rior to active screening if v > H1(YO) as has already been shown, and a separating
contract, where it exists, is superior to outright rejection for values of v close to, but
below H1(YO). Note that H1(YO) is exactly the point at which ĉ reaches its upper
corner solution and Y (ĉ) = YO + 1.
Outright rejection versus outright acceptance: The hyperplane H2(YO) in Figure
1.1 represents combinations (v; YO) for which w1 = w?, which can also be expressed
as v = YO + (1=2): It separates all combinations (v; YO) for which w? > w1 (upper-
left) from those with w? < w1 (lower-right). The two hyperplanes H1 and H2
intersect for a value of observed income
ŶO =
1  2a
2a
> 0.
At the intersection, B is indi¤erent among all three alternatives.
Outright acceptance better than ĉ: To limit further the area of possible non-trivial
separating contracts, note that such contracts are strictly dominated by outright
acceptance for all (v; YO) for which Y (ĉ(YO))  YO. This condition yields a further
hyperplane H3, which determines the combinations v and YO for which Y (ĉ(YO)) =
YO. For all (v; YO) combinations below this line the separating contract is inferior to
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outright acceptance. Unlike H1 and H2, however, this line only provides a su¢ cient
condition.
Hyperplanes H1, H2, H3 and the vertical line through (v(ŶO); ŶO) span seven re-
gions A;B;C;D; F;K; and L, for which the following partial order is established. In
region A she outrightly rejects, as rejection dominates active screening and outright
acceptance. In region F she chooses outright acceptance, as wĉ < w? and w? < w1
in this region. For regions B;C;D;K and L she will not outrightly reject. Whether
the optimal separating contract or outright acceptance yields a higher payo¤ needs
to be considered more closely. A necessary condition for the separating contract
not to be dominated by outright acceptance with c = 0 is that (v; YO) lies to the
upper-left of H3. Accordingly, outright acceptance with c = 0 occurs in regions K
and L.
So we turn to regions B, C, and D. Consider some ~YO > ŶO and go to the point
(H1( ~YO); ~YO) vertically above ~YO on H1. A reduction in v leaves w1 unchanged. But
it reduces wĉ, as
dwĉ
dv
= Y   YO > 0, (1.14)
where, by the envelope theorem, @wĉ
@Y
@Y
@v
= 0. The inequality Y   YO > 0 always
holds in an active screening equilibrium above H3. The condition (1.14) shows that
if v is decreasing between H1 and H3, then wĉ is strictly monotonically decreasing.
For YO > ŶO, consider the point (H1( ~YO); ~YO) vertically above ~YO on H1. Con-
sider a decrease in v starting from this point. At this point, wĉ = H1( ~YO) = w? < w1.
A decrease in v further reduces wĉ, but keeps w1 constant. Accordingly, wĉ < w1
for all combinations (v; YO) 2 C, establishing that B outrightly accepts with ĉ = 0
for combinations (v; YO) in region C.
For YO 2 [0; ŶO), consider again a point (H1( ~YO); ~YO) vertically above ~YO on
H1. Consider a decrease in v starting from this point. At this point, wĉ = w? =
H1( ~YO) > w1. A decrease in v decreases wĉ, but keeps w1 constant. A decrease in v
reduces wĉ   w1. Once we reach H2( ~YO), we know that wĉ > w? at this point (we
are below H1). Moreover, we know that w? = w1 at this point (which lies on H2).
Accordingly, wĉ > w1, implying that she will actively screen for all combinations
(v; YO) 2 B. If, for given ~YO, v is further reduced below H2( ~YO), then wĉ decreases
further and eventually falls below w1. For instance, for v = H3( ~YO) the strategy of
outright accepting (implying that c = 0) is superior to choosing the ĉ that makes a
suitor with Y = YO just indi¤erent about spending this ĉ > 0. By monotonicity and
the intermediate-value theorem, there is exactly one v between H2( ~YO) and H3( ~YO)
such that wĉ = w1 for this v. By this principle, we can construct a critical level of v
for every YO 2 [0; ŶO). These critical levels yield a fourth hyperplane H4(v) which
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is the dashed line in Figure 1.1. All [v; YO] between H1 and H4 and for YO 2 [0; ŶO)
describe combinations of (v; YO) for which she uses a separating contract; for all
combinations below H4 she chooses outright acceptance that yields a choice c = 0.
Lastly, we characterize H4. The condition (1.8) determines (v; YO) for which wĉ
(left-hand side) is equal to w1 (right-hand side). It separates the range wĉ > w1 from
wĉ < w1. We already showed that it has the property H2(YO) > H4(YO) > H3(YO)
for YO 2 [0; ŶO) and it passes through the intersection of H1 and H2. Further, it has
a positive slope. Note that w1 is invariant to changes in v, but increases with YO.
As H4 is an indi¤erence surface with w1 = wĉ, for a proof that its slope is indeed
positive we consider the slope of this locus. Using the envelope theorem again and
solving (Y   YO)dv + ( v + YO + 1  aY   1) dYO = 0 for this slope yields
dv
dYO
=  YO   aY   v
Y   YO
. (1.15)
As Y (ĉ(YO)) must exceed YO for separating contracts not to be strictly dominated
by outright acceptance, the denominator is positive. Further, YO   aY   v <
Y   aY   v < 0 as v > Y   ĉ (YO), which is implied by the characterization (1.9)
together with the condition stated above that v 2 [(1 a)YO+a; (YO+1)(1 a)].
Hence, the slope (1.15) is positive for all YO in the relevant range.
1.4.3 A discussion of the result
Proposition 1.1 characterizes Bs optimal choice ĉ , assuming sequentially rational
behavior of the suitor. We discuss a number of properties that follow.
Time consistency If a separating contract is used, then it is described by (1.9).
The optimal choice of ĉ(YO) just balances the marginal disadvantage and the mar-
ginal benet for B. In an optimal separating contract B accepts a suitor who spends
ĉ on conspicuous spending, generating a set of suitor types who choose this spending
level. Any suitor with Y 2 [Y (ĉ); YO+1] is accepted. This decision is time consistent
and incentive compatible at the interim stage: up to the time when B and the suitor
marry or not, B behaves optimally using all the information available at that point.
B marries undesirables At the stage when B marries or rejects the suitor, B
cannot observe the suitors income Y , but only a bracket of possible incomes. The
set of suitor types who would be accepted includes suitors who provide her with a
lower marriage utility than her fallback utility v from continuing the search. To see
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this we insert ĉ to nd that
Y (ĉ)  ĉ < v.
If B does not su¤er from the suitors conspicuous spending (i.e., for  = 0) the
critical level of ĉ is equal to av, implying that the marginal suitor has Y (ĉ) = v
and gives her exactly her reservation utility. Whenever  > 0, B marries a less
desirable suitor. She could avoid accepting such a suitor and exclude him from the
set of accepted types. She could do so by choosing a threshold c higher than ĉ,
thereby also further increasing the critical income Y (ĉ), making it undesirable for
a suitor with an income at Y (ĉ) or slightly above it to choose the required level
of conspicuous spending that would lead to acceptance. Such a strategy, however,
would be suboptimal for B. By choosing ĉ she admits also some inferior suitors
to the set of accepted types, but she reduces her utility loss ĉ from the wasteful
conspicuous consumption made by any suitor she accepts.
Bs strategy described by (1.9) is incentive compatible at the interim stage: up
to the time when B and the suitor marry or not, B behaves optimally using all
information available to her at that point.19 She knows that some of the suitors
who spent ĉ may o¤er her a lower utility than her outside option. But the choice of
ĉ does not reveal to her whether a given suitor is among these, or if he is a suitor
with a higher income. In expectation it pays for her to accept a suitor who chose ĉ.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the problem for a given v and a given YO. For a given
cut-o¤ level Y (ĉ), Bs payo¤ consists of the sum of the two shaded areas, ABCF
equal to (Y   YO)v, and EDGI, which equals the integral in (1.13). The payo¤ is
equal to the expected income of the suitor for Y > Y (ĉ), net of the area EIJF, or
[(YO + 1)  Y ]aY . This rectangle measures the cost to B of the suitors spending
on conspicuous consumption. Recall that, for a given observable income YO, all
potential suitors with income Y > Y (ĉ) are induced to spend the same amount
ĉ conspicuously. This is why only the rectangle EIJF constitutes a welfare loss,
whereas the triangle between EI and the aY function is part of Bs expected
payo¤ from suitors whom she would accept. It is the area EIJF that makes Bs
problem di¤er from a standard screening problem in which she would simply choose
a cut-o¤ of Y = v. The solution here converges to this solution for a! 0. Figure
1.2 can also illustrate the e¤ect of a marginal change in Y . An increase in Y by
one marginal unit increases the cost to B of the suitors conspicuous consumption
by a[(YO + 1)  Y ]dY . Bs gain from this increase in Y is measured by [(v   Y )+
19We rule out divorce. Were income revealed immediately after marriage and B could costlessly
divorce from a husband who turns out to have low income, divorce would, in this extreme case,
resolve the information problem and lead to di¤erent outcomes.
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aY ]dY . Equating the marginal cost and the marginal benet yields the rst-order
condition (1.11).
Figure 1.2: Bs payo¤ for a given v and YO
1.4.4 Comparative static properties
Let us further focus on the separating contract and consider its comparative static
properties.
Proposition 1.2 For the interior range in which the separating contract is optimal,
the level of conspicuous spending and the threshold level of total income that is
su¢ cient for acceptance monotonically decrease in the observed income component
YO. For a given observed income YO, conspicuous spending increases in the default
payo¤ v.
Proof. The comparative static results follow directly from (1.9) and by (1.10):
@Y (ĉ (YO))
@YO
=   a
1  2a < 0
@Y (ĉ (YO))
@v
=
1
1  2a > 0.
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The e¤ect of old money In the separating contract the required level of con-
spicuous spending declines with the suitors observable income. This pattern is
consistent with the notion described in Section 1.1 about old money. If the suitor
has a rich family background, an aristocratic title, or other observable character-
istics that have a positive monetary equivalent, the suitor needs less conspicuous
consumption to make B marry him. Our interpretation of the observable income
component YO as an old moneybackground requires that what is observed as old
moneycorresponds credibly to an observable component of wealth. Of course, some
noble families have dwindling material wealth. But the argument remains valid un-
der dwindling wealth. It is the aristocratic name that is observed, and this name and
the family history it stands for is, in itself, the observable asset. In many societies
the title, name or pedigree itself have value, and that can be given some monetary
equivalent. Also, in this interpretation in the equilibrium old moneysuitors need
less wealth on average to be acceptable to B. The threshold level of total income
that is acceptable for her in the equilibrium is lower for old money(high YO) than
for the nouveaux riches(low YO). So, in comparison, the nouveaux richesface
two disadvantages in the marriage market. They must spend more on conspicuous
consumption to be assessed as su¢ ciently rich, and they need to be richer on average
to be successful, compared to old moneysuitors.
The e¤ect of the marriage premium a We can also consider Bs strategy for
a su¢ ciently small and for a su¢ ciently large marriage premium a. Several factors
may a¤ect the size of a. On the macro-level, the shares of males and females in
the population may be unbalanced. On the micro-level the value attributed to
marrying B may depend on her beauty or character. When a ! 0, B o¤ers a
separating contract to all suitors regardless of their observable income, as in the
limit separating becomes costless. Let us compare B with a ! 0 to B with some
positive a. When the value of a is not too small, and when B has a su¢ ciently
large default utility (v > (YO + 1) =2), the income threshold and thus the required
amount of conspicuous consumption increase in a. A woman who is more sought
after requests higher conspicuous spending. The selection of su¢ ciently rich suitors
becomes more costly for her. Admittedly, this may only be the e¤ect that occurs
for a given distribution of suitors. A woman with a higher a may attract a di¤erent,
superior pool of suitors, which may cause countervailing e¤ects.
Departing from (1.3), let a  1=(2), so that B does not use a separating con-
tract. For a  1=(2) the objective function in the third line of (1.13) is convex.
There exists no interior solution for the critical income level Y . The two possible
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corner solutions lead to w?(v; YO) and w1(v; YO). For a low YO she rejects; for a
high observable income she accepts. The threshold is ~YO + 12 = v.
Bs cost of separating suitors Our last comparative study concerns the role of
the cost of separating suitors. Our approach di¤ers from the standard one, as B bears
a share, , of the cost of the suitors activity undertaken to be married. As discussed
above, if B bears no part in this cost, i.e.,  = 0, she sets the critical income threshold
equal to her reservation utility (formally, Y (ĉ) = v). If the conspicuous spending
requested does not a¤ect the quality, number, or frequency of suitors showing up, and
if  = 0, B would always o¤er a separating contract, irrespective of their observable
income.
1.5 Dynamic implications
We so far solved for Bs optimal local strategy if she interacts with one suitor who
wants to marry her, with B and the suitor having exogenous default utilities. We
determined her optimal contract o¤er. Her problem may be embedded in a dynamic
game, for instance, a sequence of marriage decisions, which continue until she mar-
ries. Such a framework typically has a Markov property: Bs payo¤ from marrying a
given suitor depends only on this suitors conspicuous consumption c and income Y ,
but typically does not depend on the sequence of rejections that occurred previously.
This independence allows us to consider a single marriage decision in isolation, as we
did in Section 1.4, and where the behavior characterizes local strategies as a function
of the current suitors observed income component YO and the suitors conspicuous
consumption.
In a dynamic framework a few further aspects need to be specied. One aspect is
the distribution from which the observable income component of subsequent suitors
is drawn, how this distribution changes over time, and the frequency with which
new suitors show up if B rejects the current suitor. Several variables in the analysis
may also be interdependent. The arrival rate of new suitors may, for instance, itself
be related to Bs attractiveness. Also, the utility when unmarried and how she
discounts the future need to be described.
If the time horizon is long and B anticipates a long series of possible suitors
following each rejection, all drawn from the same distribution of suitors, then the
dynamic problem may be reasonably well described as a stationary problem. The
decision problem in Section 1.4 can then be seen as the period decision in a dynamic
framework with an innite number of periods, with one suitor showing up in each
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period until B nally marries. A possible extension of our framework is to solve for
the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in stationary Markov strategies. A formal analysis
would require some notation, but conceptually it is clear how the continuation value
v is endogenously determined, and is the discounted value of Bs expected payo¤ if
she does not marry in a given period but rather waits for future options.
Stationarity need not be an appropriate description in the marriage context. B
naturally grows older, future suitors may reassess their benets of marrying her,
and the ow of further suitors may be nite and may change its characteristics over
time. This changes her default utility of rejecting a suitor from one marriage decision
to the next. She may feel her biological clock ticking; being older, she may feel a
greater urge to nd a supporting husband soon. For the decision problem analyzed
in Section 1.4, these aspects nd their counterparts mostly in a change in v over
time. If her default utility decreases, in the range in which separating contracts are
optimal, B will be willing to marry a suitor with a lower total income, and she will
require less conspicuous consumption as proof of a suitors unobservable income.
Also, a reduction in v may result in a change of the equilibrium regime. As seen in
Figure 1.1, a reduction in v may cause either of several transitions. For some values
of observed income, B changes her behavior from a separating contract to outright
acceptance. For some values of observed income, she changes her behavior from
outright rejection to a separating contract. For some observed income she changes
her behavior from outright rejection to outright acceptance.
The number of future marriage options may narrow over time, thereby reducing
v.20 The pool of suitors may change over time. Suitors will also be older. As argued
by Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993), the information asymmetry regarding mens life-
time income declines over time. An increase in a suitors age typically causes a shift
in which part of income or ability is observable and which part is unobservable. If B
can observe a larger proportion of potential income, her information problem is sim-
plied. The rst-round e¤ect of improved information is to increase default utility
v over the lifetime. In addition, young male suitors with a high earnings potential
in comparison to what is observable tend to wait, making older suitors a positive
self-selected sample. This selection e¤ect should also increase v. Suitors with a high
earnings potential may wait because they expect delay to improve their attractive-
ness, which in turn changes their aspirations. This may reduce a, the parameter
measuring the suitorsdesire to marry a specic B. It remains an intricate research
question to study the interaction between Bs information extraction problem and
20Other factors not modelled here explicitly, may also enter into Bs default utility v. She may
earn some income on her own, which may increase over time, and in turn, increase v as B ages.
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the suitors means to change the distribution of observable and unobservable income
components over time.
Empirically, age matters.21 Consumption of conspicuous goods strongly de-
creases with age (Charles et al. 2009). An explanation suggested by our model
is that women searching for husbands become less demanding as they age. Findings
by Voland and Engel (1990) are in line with this argument. Using demographic
data from historic parish registers to study the relationship between womens age at
marriage and suitorsownership of land, they nd that younger women were more
likely to marry well situated men. Voland and Engel interpret these ndings as
evidence that women followed an age-dependent mate selection maxim that read:
If you are young, be very choosy and marry only a high-quality mate. The older
you become, the more you must reduce your standards concerning your marriage
partner!(Voland and Engel 1990, p.146).
Overall, ageing has several e¤ects, with many of these pointing at a reduction
of v over the lifetime and to a better informed B at the time of decision making.
The empirical counterpart (and testable hypothesis) for this result is a relationship
between age and courtship spending. Ceteris paribus, the intensity of status con-
sumption during courtship should decrease with age, perhaps explaining the nding
by Charles et al. (2009) that age reduces the propensity to buy conspicuous goods.
Though a standard explanation for such a pattern may be lost ambitions,or illu-
sions lostand a more realistic attitude toward life,our theory would explain the
pattern as an equilibrium phenomenon among people who are fully rational when
they are young and when they are old.
The formal analysis considered a static model in which Y = YO + YU accrues
instantaneously, and spending is made from this total income, which clouds the
dynamic aspects of the problem. Marriage occurs relatively early in life, YU may be
income components that emerge later in life, and conspicuous spending can include
both status consumption goods and conspicuous capital goods.
A fully dynamic model would be much richer and would allow for aspects such
as consumption/investment choices. However, the main trade-o¤ that is described
in the static model would be unchanged: addressing the information asymmetry
between B and the suitors will entail conspicuous activities, and will typically involve
distortions in the spending or investment decisions towards conspicuous spending.
21Waynforth and Dunbar (1995) nd that whereas men become more demanding with age,
women become less demanding. Bereczkei et al. (1997) nd, however, that the proportion of
women demanding traits associated with high wealth and high status is constant across age groups.
Pawlowski and Dunbar (1999) conclude that female advertisers who try to present themselves as
younger than they really are tend to be more demanding in what they look for in a prospective
partner.
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What matters for our analysis is that, for a given amount of conspicuous spending,
these distortions are lower for suitors whose lifetime income is higher.
In such a dynamic model, much of the income accrues later in life post-marriage,
and cannot be collateralized. This makes it impossible to overcome the information
problem by the visible purchase of investment goods. As argued by others (Frank
1985a), suitors may invest in excessively expensive goods and lifestyle to indicate
their high expectations about their earnings ability. They distort their consumption
decision both towards the present and towards conspicuous consumption.
1.6 Discussion and conclusions
We studied conspicuous spending in marriage matching to address incomplete in-
formation about a suitors unobserved income. Conspicuous spending can provide
information about a possible partners wealth or income prospects. We show that a
potential bride can set a threshold of conspicuous spending to sort wealthier from
less wealthy suitors and thereby induce but also curb conspicuous spending during
courtship. This threshold depends on how a suitors total income is composed of
directly observable income and income that B cannot directly observe. Suitors with
the same total income but with a larger share of directly observable income need
to spend less conspicuously to marry, and the equilibrium amount of conspicuous
spending is higher if the suitors emotional rent from marriage is higher. Because
B wants to limit conspicuous spending, her optimal strategy may have her marry a
suitor whom she would prefer not to. We also saw that B may su¤er when suitors
much value marrying her, because they will then spend excessively on the conspic-
uous good, which she little values. And if B has good alternatives to marriage, she
would want to marry only a suitor with high income, which induces greater spending
on the conspicuous good; therefore she will get less utility from marrying a person
with a given wealth. Lastly, we show that a suitor with high observable income
gains not only from having more money, but also from needing to spend less on the
conspicuous good.
Matching and the choice of marriage partners is a complex matter in which
many dimensions matter, and multiple information problems prevail. Information
problems may be two-sided, screening may su¤er from commitment problems on
both sides, personal characteristics other than wealth or beauty may matter. Also,
conspicuous consumption and status gifts are not homogeneous. In a more general
model, there may be multiple means to overcome the income information problem
and to a¤ect the amount of wealth brought into the marriage; conspicuous consump-
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tion and status gifts are two of them. Lastly, multiple women may be courted by
multiple suitors. If they show up sequentially, the history of rejections may matter.
Our analysis focuses on incomplete information about a potential partners wealth.
This is one aspect in the matching context which we think is of major importance.
Our model shows how courting behavior may respond to thresholds set by the
courted woman. Conspicuous spending that is at least partially wasteful is costly
both for the prospective husband, and for the potential bride. She cares about the
income that is available for joint family spending and for raising children. A suitor
who spends much of his income wastefully on conspicuous goods during courtship
will reduce the very income that is available for joint family consumption. Both
she and the suitor su¤er from this reduction in family income. Selecting a worthy
suitor by his spending on conspicuous spending is therefore a mixed pleasure: a
higher aspiration threshold, aimed at selecting wealthier suitors, directly reduces
this selected suitors quality as a husband. In some instances the cost can be so
high even to her that she may avoid using such a mechanism: she may be better-
o¤ by making an outright decision about marrying or rejecting a suitor and base
this decision on the part of the suitors observable income. Her default utility, the
amount of a suitors directly observable part of income (old money), the welfare
cost of conspicuous spending, and how she shares in this cost, are all crucial for her
selection choice.
The formal analysis makes several predictions that t with casual or anecdotal
evidence. In particular, it can explain why conspicuous spending is discouraged or
is very low for suitors from a rich family, or other visible indications of high wealth
(old money), whereas it is more prominent among the new rich. It also o¤ers a
rational choice explanation for lower conspicuous spending and less extensive gift
giving of status goods with courting among older cohorts.
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Chapter 2
Conspicuous Consumption,
Privacy and Optimal Auditing
2.1 Introduction
In recent years owners of luxury cars, yachts and swimming pools in countries such
as Italy or Greece may have started to think twice when ling their income report to
the tax authority. After targeting yacht owners in the summer of 2010, less than two
years later Italian authorities went for drivers of luxury SUVs, Porsches and other
high-end cars to check if their ownersobservable lifestyle potentially renders their
income report implausible.1 Greek authorities in their crackdown on tax evaders
used Google Earth to identify some 50,000 swimming pools which their owners had
kept secret from the taxman.2
Clearly, conspicuous consumption3 may give away someone who cheated on his
income declaration and tax authorities may therefore consider conspicuous consump-
tion as a signal of prosperity and use this additional information to single out tax
evaders. Nevertheless, there has been very little research on optimal audit policy
that takes conspicuous consumption into account. This is why this chapter addresses
the following research questions: First, what is the optimal audit policy when tax-
payers may choose to evade income taxes and consume a continuum of goods some
of which are conspicuous? And second, if the share of conspicuous goods increases,
how do the optimal audit policy and welfare change? In an extension to the basic
1See Sirletti and Donovan (2010), Ebhardt (2012), Moody (2012).
2See Smith (2010).
3We use the adjective conspicuousin its literal sense to refer to consumption, which is ob-
servable. Observability here is an inherent property of certain goods, which consumers take as
given when choosing how much to consume. In contrast to Thorstein Veblen, who introduced
the term conspicuous consumptionin his Theory of the Leisure Class,we abstract from status
considerations.
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model, we then study a tax reform that introduces a consumption tax on conspicu-
ous goods and ask how this a¤ects the optimal audit policy and welfare. Lastly, we
also extend the model to account for unobserved heterogeneity in taxpayerscost
from being audited.
For tax authorities it has been relatively easy to make owners of certain conspic-
uous goods such as luxury cars or yachts the targets of their audit policy. The only
restriction may be laws prohibiting cross-checking registration and licence data with
information obtained from income reports. However, with Google Earth and people
sharing information about their private lives on Facebook and Twitter or even about
their purchases4, a larger share of the goods consumed by a single person becomes
observable to a greater audience. Hence, taking observable consumption into ac-
count may also become increasingly relevant for tax audits. In addition, it has been
discussed to provide families with smart cardsto be used when purchasing goods
as a way to grant a sales tax credit based on family size.5 A likely result would be
that tax authorities obtain detailed information about familiesconsumption proles
which can then be linked to their income reports to detect tax evaders.
To some extent, such a prospect may give rise to privacy concerns.6 Lessig (1990)
identies three notions of privacy concerns which are summarized in Slemrod (2006)
as follows: rst, the burden of intrusion; second, the o¤ense of ones dignity, and
third, one may invoke privacy concerns to limit the governments means to practi-
cally enforce its policy which will then also limit its power to introduce regulatory
policies. The rst and last point seem to be less relevant as long as tax authorities
rely only on information about taxpayers consumption which is observable any-
way. Nevertheless, citizens may feel that it is wrong to target owners of conspicuous
goods: It seems like the McCarthy era in America. Youre guilty by suspicion,
said an Italian taxpayer who drives a luxury SUV and has been stopped by the
authorities three times within a few weeks.7
To address the role of conspicuous consumption for optimal auditing, we study a
tax compliance game in which the government species audit probabilities that are
4In 2010 a website called Blippy was launched on which users could share information about
their purchases with their followers (Pilon 2010). Pilon cites one of the founders of Blippy who
said: With Twitter, youre sharing what youre doing. With Flickr, youre sharing photos that
were once private. Things people used to think were private arent any more.
5This is mentioned in Slemrod (2006). For a detailed discussion of smart cards, see Cowell
(2008).
6For a survey on the economics of privacy, see Hui and Png (2006). See also Konrad (2001) and
Dodds (2002), which studies a model similar to a tax compliance game in which the government
possesses a costless monitoring technology and a public good can only be produced by identifying
high types (within a two-types population) who have an incentive to misrepresent themselves to
avoid contributing relatively more toward the public good.
7This is reported in Ebhardt (2012).
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contingent on taxpayersreported income and observable consumption. Specically,
we assume that the government o¤ers a menu of combinations of an income report,
a conspicuous consumption prole, and an audit probability maximizing welfare
subject to incentive constraints and the governments budget constraint. In the
next stage of the game, citizens self-select ling an income report and paying taxes
accordingly before choosing their consumption for a continuum of goods some of
which are observable and some of which are unobservable to a greater audience.
In the third stage, citizens are then audited and punished if found evading income
taxes.
Previous research that studies direct and indirect taxation in the context of tax
evasion is certainly relevant here8, though this chapter is chiey related to the liter-
ature on optimal audit policy. In line with Reinganum and Wilde (1985), Scotchmer
(1987) and Sánchez and Sobel (1993), we adopt what is frequently referred to as the
principal-agent approach assuming that the tax authority or government commits
itself to some audit probability (or, in fact, several audit probabilities) contingent
on reported income before taxpayers le their reports.9 An alternative strand of
the literature on tax audits deals with the interaction between taxpayers and the
tax authority when the latter cannot commit itself to an audit rule. Reinganum
and Wilde (1986), Graetz, Reinganum, and Wilde (1986), and Erard and Feinstein
(1994) follow this approach.10 As we later in this chapter will consider unobserved
heterogeneity in taxpayerscost from being audited, another related paper is Caballé
and Panadés (2005) which assumes uncertainty about taxpayersidiosyncratic cost
of su¤ering an inspection, however, this paper does not allow for commitment on
inspection rules.11
A feature which our model has in common with part of the tax auditing litera-
ture is that the tax authority may have access to some information in addition to
the income reported by the taxpayer. Scotchmer (1987) allows for an audit proba-
8A number of papers have introduced tax evasion into optimal tax problems. Cremer, Marc-
hand, and Pestieau (1990) allows for several audit classes and di¤erent audit probabilities for each
class to maximize net revenue, and studies the welfare maximizing linear income tax. Cremer and
Gahvari (1994) is concerned with optimal linear income taxation when the governments audit
probability is purely random, i.e., independent of taxpayersactions, but the detection probabil-
ity depends on investment in concealing evasion and on the fraction and amount of unreported
income. See also Cremer and Gahvari (1996), Chander and Wilde (1998), and Sandmo (1981).
Papers studying optimal commodity taxation if there is evasion are, for example, Cremer and
Gahvari (1993), Kaplow (1990) and Wigger (2002).
9A more recent contribution with commitment by the tax authority is Meyer-Brauns (2014),
which considers taxpayers as heterogenous in how they perceive the likelihood of an audit.
10For a survey on the tax compliance literature, see Andreoni et al. (1998) and Slemrod and
Yitzhaki (2002).
11In addition, in Caballé and Panadés (2005) taxpayers face uncertainty about tax inspectors
cost of auditing.
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bility that depends on the income reported by the taxpayer, but also on additional
characteristics known to the taxpayer (such as his age or profession). These are sum-
marized in an additional signal which is correlated with the taxpayers true income
and used by the tax authority to assign the taxpayer to an audit class. The tax
authority can then choose di¤erent audit probabilities for each audit class. In con-
trast, Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (2002) assumes that the taxpayer himself
remains uncertain about the amount of information observed by the tax authority
in addition to his reported income. The tax authority observes a random signal
whose realization depends on the taxpayers true income. Following the principal-
agent approach, the authors consider the tax authority to commit itself to an audit
probability that is a function of the income reported and the signal received by the
tax authority.
Few papers have taken the role of taxpayersconsumption decisions for tax eva-
sion into account. Yaniv (2013) focuses on tax compliance behavior as studied in
the seminal paper Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and assumes an audit probability
which is decreasing in income declared and increasing in conspicuous consumption.12
Also following this approach to study the behavior of a representative taxpayer for
some given audit policy, Levaggi and Menoncin (2015) is a working paper which
considers tax evasion in a dynamic setting. A representative consumer has an ini-
tial amount of wealth which creates some income in each period and the consumer
chooses the fraction of evaded income for each period. He allocates his income
between savings and consumption. As in Yaniv (2013), in Levaggi and Menoncin
(2015), there are just two goods, a conspicuous and a normal good. The government
can observe consumption of both goods, but only consumption of the conspicuous
good a¤ects the consumers probability to be audited.13 The larger the di¤erence
between spending on the conspicuous good as presumed by the government and the
12Introducing a conspicuity coe¢ cient to take the extra status related utility of conspicuous
consumption into account, Yaniv (2013) nds that a higher coe¢ cient relaxes the entry condition
for tax evasion such that evasion becomes less likely. See also Goerke (2013) which introduces
relative consumption concerns to study taxpayersjoint decision of how much labor to supply and
how much income to declare assuming an exogenous detection probability which is independent of
a taxpayers income report and consumption.
13Specically, the audit probability is assumed to be given by the di¤erence of two components:
the rst component is the exogenous and constant frequency of audits which is not a¤ected by
the consumers behavior; the second component is given by the di¤erence between spending on
the conspicuous good as presumed by the government and the consumers actual spending on the
conspicuous good.
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consumers actual spending on the conspicuous good, the lower is the consumers
probability to be audited.14
Yaniv (2003) focuses on the optimal audit of ghosts, i.e., individuals who evade
income taxes by not declaring their income to the tax authority at all. Taxpayers
may buy a single observable good with two available types and the tax authority may
take ownership of this good as a signal of prosperity into account. Contrary to the
audit policy studied in our model, Yaniv (2003) assumes that buying the cheap type
of the observable good is an e¤ective sheltering strategy for non-declaring individuals
who will never be audited in this case.15 The tax authority then determines its
optimal audit probability for owners of the expensive observable good who may
either be tax evaders or retirees exempt from paying taxes.
Not looking at auditing, but at optimal income taxation, Konrad (2010) al-
lows for the government to use information about citizensobservable consumption.
Specically, in a two-period-framework with two income groups, individuals consume
a discrete number of goods in each period, and in the second period the government
levies an individual specic income tax which is a function of the individuals ob-
servable consumption in the rst period. We build on Konrads approach in that we
also assume that a share of consumption is observable and we also study the wel-
fare e¤ects if this share, i.e., the degree of privacy, changes. Whereas Konrads more
general formulation of taxpayersutility allows for some heterogeneity, we consider a
specic utility function which is identical for all taxpayers. The advantage of consid-
ering this specic utility function together with a continuum of consumption goods
will become clear when we discuss the e¤ects of a decrease in privacy in Section 2.4.
Whereas we assume commitment power on the part of the government, Konrad mod-
els a signaling game in which beliefs are formed based on observable consumption,
and the government lacks the ability to commit itself not to use this information
on citizensobservable consumption for tax purposes. Consequently, the author can
highlight a time consistency problem which lies at the heart of the negative impact of
observable consumption and of a decrease in privacy on welfare identied in Konrad
(2010): In a pooling equilibrium, high-income individuals forgo utility in the rst
period by mimicking the low-income typesobservable consumption in order to avoid
14For the parameter constellations for which an interior solution exists, Levaggi and Menoncin
nd that the representative taxpayer chooses an optimal evasion and consumption path which
results in an audit probability maximizing the taxpayers intertemporal utility.
15See also Tubul (2003) which is a working paper closely related to Yaniv (2003) and considers
individuals joint decision of how much income to declare to the tax authority and the binary
decision of whether or not to buy a conspicuous good. Similar to Yaniv (2003), not buying the
conspicuous good is an e¤ective sheltering strategy as, by assumption, consumers are never audited
in this case.
35
Conspicuous Consumption, Privacy and Optimal Auditing
a higher income tax in the second period; in one of the two separating equilibria
in Konrad (2010), low-income individuals forgo utility by decreasing their observ-
able consumption in order to avoid being pooled with the high-income group.16 In
the optimal auditing problem considered in this chapter, high-income individuals
may underreport and choose to imitate low-income typesobservable consumption
to increase their net income. However, with an optimally determined audit policy,
high-income individuals can be induced to pay taxes honestly. A decrease in privacy
a¤ects the incentive constraint for high-income individuals such that audit costs go
down which ultimately increases welfare. We discuss our results in relation to those
in Konrad (2010) in Section 2.7 in more detail.
Another nding of this chapter is that a tax reform introducing a consumption
tax on observable goods combined with appropriately set refunds also reduces audit
costs and in turn improves welfare. In line with Boadway, Marchand and Pestieau
(1994) as well as Richter and Boadway (2005), we assume that the income tax can
be evaded, whereas the consumption tax on conspicuous goods cannot be evaded.17
Boadway, Marchand and Pestieau (1994) provides an argument in favor of commod-
ity taxes which by assumption cannot be evaded, to supplement a general non-linear
income tax which can be evaded by taxpayers.18 Individuals, who have high or low
ability, choose consumption of two goods, their labor supply and how much income
to declare to the tax authority. If they misreport their income to the tax authority,
taxpayers incur some concealment costs. Once they invested in concealment, tax
evaders cannot be detected by the tax authority. Thus, in contrast to the framework
we study here, tax evasion is not modelled as a decision under uncertainty.
As this chapter focuses on the role of conspicuous consumption for optimal au-
dit policy, we consider a population with only two income groups assuming that
low-income earners are exempt from paying income taxes. However, low-income
earners may also buy conspicuous goods. As an extreme example, think of people
who scrimp and save to buy lifestyle gadgets or even a high-end car instead. For
the purpose of this chapter, the only di¤erence between conspicuous and inconspic-
uous goods is that consumption of the rst type is observable to everyone including
16In the second separating equilibrium in Konrad (2010) low-income individuals can choose
consumption at rst best-level because high-income individuals nd it too unattractive to mimic
them.
17Richter and Boadway (2005) studies an optimal tax problem with a proportional tax on labor
which can be evaded and a tax on consumption goods which cannot be evaded. However, the
authors assume an exogenous audit probability which is independent of taxpayerschoices. See
also Gordon and Nielsen (1997) and Kesselman (1993).
18The authors nd that su¢ cient conditions for uniform commodity taxes to be optimal are
that preferences are separable between goods and leisure and quasi-homothetic in goods.
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the taxman whereas consumption of the latter is not.19 The primary example for
inconspicuous goods may be food consumed at home. We do not assume that con-
spicuous goods provide some extra, status related utility. Hence, it is not status
driven overconsumption that motivates a tax on conspicuous goods here, as will be
explained further below.20
We treat observability as an inherent, exogenous property of certain goods, i.e.,
consumers can only choose how much to consume, but not whether this is observable
or not. We take consumerstaste for varietyinto account introducing Dixit-Stiglitz
preferences on the part of taxpayers.21 This allows us to analyze the comparative
statics of the optimal audit policy when a larger share of consumption goods becomes
observable. We can imagine a number of reasons why the fraction of observable
goods increases: New technologies become available not only to taxpayers, but also
to tax authorities; smart cards as mentioned above may be introduced; laws may
be changed allowing tax authorities to combine sources of information (e.g., on a
taxpayers income report and his car licence) which were previously kept separately.
For some of these developments, tax authorities may take advantage of taxpayers
changing attitudes toward how much information they share about their private
lives and what they consume.
In line with previous theoretical work, we argue that the tax authority can con-
dition audit probabilities not only on reported income, but also on some additional
information which here is taken as taxpayersconspicuous consumption. This may
provide taxpayers with an incentive to distort their consumption behavior substan-
tially. In our model, citizens reporting the low income to the tax authority also
choose the conspicuous consumption prole associated with a low income and tax
evaders diverging from this consumption pattern are audited with certainty. Individ-
uals reporting the high income are never audited regardless of what they consume.
The audit probability for citizens reporting the low income and choosing the corre-
sponding conspicuous consumption prole is set such that high-income earners are
just indi¤erent between honesty and evasion.22
We diverge from previous work on tax evasion in that there is no punishment in
terms of nes paid by caught evaders in our model. Instead, we assume that someone
who cheated on his income report and is then audited, incurs some non-monetary
19Studying racial di¤erences in consumption patterns, Charles, Hurst and Roussanov (2009)
mentions cars and apparel including jewelry as primary examples for visible goods. The authors
nd that visible goods are in fact luxury goods.
20Weisbach (2008) includes a survey on taxation of status goods.
21This type of preferences was rst introduced in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
22As mentioned above, by the assumptions made in Yaniv (2003), citizens choosing the conspic-
uous consumption prole associated with a low income would never be audited.
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loss.23 The damage experienced by a caught evader is modelled as a non-monetary
loss instead of a monetary penalty because the latter would require assumptions
on how nes are collected once evaders spent all their money on consumption. In
contrast to optimal auditing models without consumption, in our model it becomes
apparent that a tax evader may not be able to pay back the evaded amount of taxes
plus a ne. Hence, the non-monetary loss introduced here may be thought of as the
evaders disutility from being sent to prison instead of paying a ne. Public shaming
may be another explanation.24
For most part of this chapter, we assume the non-monetary loss to be identical
across citizens. Hence, individuals only di¤er along a single dimension, i.e., their
income which takes either of two values. As the low-income group is exempt from
paying income taxes, the governments revenue requirement can be only met by
inducing the high-income group to pay taxes honestly. Thus, in equilibrium, evasion
does not occur. Given our framework, this may no longer be the case if individuals
di¤er along a second dimension, as we show in an extension to the basic model
accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in taxpayersnon-monetary loss.
Let us summarize some key ndings of this chapter. Studying the governments
audit policy in a tax compliance game with two income groups and conspicuous
consumption, this chapter suggests that audit costs go down as the fraction of con-
spicuous goods increases. In turn, because lower income tax payments su¢ ce to
meet the governments budget constraint, high-income earners benet from a higher
after-tax income increasing overall welfare. Moreover, we can show that a con-
sumption tax on conspicuous goods combined with appropriate refunds a¤ects the
incentive constraint for high-income taxpayers in a way which also reduces audit
costs. With unobserved heterogeneity in taxpayers cost from being audited and
exogenously xed tax payments, welfare also goes up as more consumption becomes
observable. However, the welfare benet accrues to tax evaders whose share in the
society increases and who are audited with a lower probability.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the
model framework of the tax compliance game which we then solve in Section 2.3.
The comparative statics on the share of conspicuous goods are presented in Section
2.4. We then extend the basic model framework, studying a tax reform introducing a
23It is well known that punishing evaders innitely harsh with zero probability would deter
taxpayers most e¤ectively from cheating on the taxman (Becker 1968), however, punishment is
typically assumed to be bounded due to legal constraints and social conventions. Similarly, here
the non-monetary loss is also xed and nite.
24An alternative approach is found in Levaggi and Menoncin (2015): Due to the dynamic
setting in which the representative consumers initial amount of wealth generates a stream of
income allocated between savings and consumption, a caught tax evader is able to pay a ne.
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consumption tax on conspicuous goods in Section 2.5 and unobserved heterogeneity
in taxpayers cost from being audited in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 discusses and
concludes.
2.2 Model
Consider a population consisting of two groups of taxpayers whose income is their
private information. A fraction  2 (0; 1) belongs to the high-income group with
before-tax income yH , the fraction (1  ) belongs to the low-income group with
before-tax income yL with yL < yH . Citizens in the high-income group have to pay
an income tax of size T ; the low-income group is exempt from paying income taxes.
We denote net incomes by N! 2 fNL; NHg with NL = yL and NH = yH   T . We
discuss the implication of excluding low-income earners from income tax payments
for the governments maximization problem further below. Moreover, we assume
(corresponding to what we typically observe) that the tax payment and the di¤erence
between yL and yH are such that after paying the income tax, a high-income type still
has a larger budget to spend compared to a low-income earner, i.e., that NH > yL.
Taxpayers spend their after-tax income on consumption. There exists a con-
tinuum of consumption goods and the mass of available goods is normalized to
unity. Goods di¤er in one key characteristic: whether or not their consumption is
observable to everyone including the tax authority. In the following, we refer to
observable ones as conspicuous goods and to unobservable ones as inconspicuous.25
Conspicuous goods belong to category j with j 2 [0; h], inconspicuous goods fall
into category k with k 2 [h; 1]. Depending on the category the good belongs to, we
denote the quantity consumed of a single good by a citizen of type ! by x!;j and
x!;k, respectively, where subscript ! 2 fL;Hg. We use ! with ! 2 fL;Hg to refer
to a taxpayers conspicuous consumption prole26. In both categories of goods, con-
sumer prices equal producer prices and are normalized to unity, i.e., pj = pk = 1.27
Thus, a taxpayers budget constraint is given by
N! =
Z h
0
x!;j dj +
Z 1
h
x!;k dk. (2.1)
25As mentioned in Section 2.1, here the adjective conspicuousmeans observable, but does
not imply any status considerations.
26We use ! as a shorthand notation to refer to the collection of all conspicuous goods consumed
by a citizen of type ! with ! 2 fL;Hg, i.e., to x!;j for all j 2 [0; h].
27In Section 2.5, we study a tax reform that introduces a tax on conspicuous goods, which will
then be more expensive compared to inconspicuous goods.
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Taxpayers have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences represented by the following CES-
utility function
U! =
Z h
0
(x!;j)
 dj +
Z 1
h
(x!;k)
 dk
 1

(2.2)
with  2 (0; 1), and the elasticity of substitution is given by   1
1  . This utility
representation implies that consumers have a taste for variety.
As a benchmark, consider the quantities consumed in the rst best, i.e., if income
was perfectly observable to the government and citizens paid their taxes honestly.
In this case, each citizen chooses his consumption of conspicuous and inconspicuous
goods to maximize his utility given in equation (2.2) subject to the budget constraint
in (2.1). We solve this constrained optimization problem formally in Appendix
A.1. Due to citizenstaste for variety and because prices are uniform, consumers
spread their budget evenly across goods. Hence, as the mass of goods and all
prices are normalized to unity, optimal consumption quantities are given by xFB!;i =
xFB!;l = N! for all i 2 [0; h] and l 2 [h; 1] with ! 2 fL;Hg. Thus, the budget
allocated to conspicuous goods is hN! and the budget spent on inconspicuous ones
is (1  h)N!. Plugging the consumed quantities of conspicuous and inconspicuous
goods into taxpayersutility function we obtain their indirect utility
V honest! = (h (N!)
 + (1  h) (N!))
1

= N!.
Let us now consider the tax compliance problem. As income is only privately
observed, tax payments are based on reported income by 2 fyH ; yLg.28 High-income
earners may want to evade taxes by misreporting their income and the government
only learns their true income by auditing them. Citizens may be audited by the tax
authority with an audit probability  () to be specied below.
An evader who is audited incurs a non-monetary utility loss .29 We can interpret
this loss as the tax evaders disutility from being sent to prison30 or the utility loss
from being singled out in a naming and shaming program against tax evasion. We
replaced the monetary penalty assumed in standard auditing models with a non-
monetary loss, because modelling how nes are collected when evaders spent all their
28We restrict the message space to by 2 fyH ; yLg. As the government knows that there are only
two income groups in the society, taxpayers cannot credibly report any income other than yL or
yH , or they would be immediately identied as tax evaders.
29We assume perfect audits such that any evader who is audited is also detected evading taxes.
30Tax evaders may not be able to pay back the amount of taxes evaded and a potential ne
because they already spent the money on consumption goods. Hence, they are sent to prison
instead.
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money on consumption would complicate the analysis without adding much insight
with respect to our research question. By assumption,  is identical for all taxpayers
and nite.31 In addition, we assume that  is su¢ ciently large such that a high-
income taxpayer always prefers reporting his income honestly to evading and being
audited with certainty; otherwise auditing potential tax evaders would be a futile
exercise. Specically, we assume that a tax evader who spreads his total income yH
equally across all goods maximizing his consumption utility and is caught by the
tax authority is worse o¤ compared to an honest high-income earner, i.e.,
V honestH = NH > yH   , (2.3)
implying that  > yH   NH = T . Additionally, we assume that a tax evader
who imitates the rst-best conspicuous consumption prole of a low-income citizen
and spreads the remaining budget evenly across inconspicuous goods always prefers
evading taxes if he is not detected over paying his taxes honestly, i.e.,
V evaderundetected =

h (yL)
 + (1  h)

yH   hyL
1  h
 1
> NH = V
honest
H . (2.4)
The signicance of this specic consumption pattern and of conditions (2.3) and
(2.4) will become clear in the proof of Proposition 2.1 below.
We assume that the government o¤ers a menu of combinations (by; !;  ()) con-
sisting of an income report, a conspicuous consumption prole, and an audit prob-
ability. The government chooses these combinations maximizing expected welfare
subject to several constraints. The governments tax authority audits based on
a taxpayers conspicuous consumption prole and his income report. Thus, audit
probabilities are a function of a taxpayers observable consumption prole ! and
reported income by, i.e.,  (!; by) 2 [0; 1]. Generally, with two types, the government
menu consists of two combinations, (yL; L;  (L; yL)) and (yH ; H ;  (H ; yH)). In
what follows we will restrict the governments choice set for the conspicuous con-
sumption prole o¤ered to low-income earners: We assume that in combination with
the low income report by = yL the government o¤ers the e¢ cient conspicuous con-
sumption prole L = L which has xL;i = x
FB
L;i = yL for all i 2 [0; h]. We discuss
the relevance of this assumption in detail in Section 2.3.
Note that the government cannot restrict citizenschoice of an income report
and consumption prole to the combinations included in the menu the government
o¤ers. Therefore the government announces and commits to a schedule of audit
31In Section 2.6 we allow for unobserved heterogeneity with respect to .
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probabilities, stating the audit probability for each possible combination of conspic-
uous consumption prole and income report.
Expected welfare is dened as the sum of taxpayersexpected utility,
W = (1  )EUL(yL; L;  (L; yL)) + EUH(yH ; H ;  (H ; yH)) (2.5)
where EU!(y!; !;  (!; y!)) gives the expected utility of a citizen of type ! who
reports income y!, chooses the conspicuous consumption prole ! and is, hence,
audited with probability  (!; y!).
The government maximizes (2.5) subject to a set of constraints:
EUL(yL; L;  (L; yL))  EUL(by; !;  (!; by)) 8 by 6= yL; ! 6= L (2.6)
EUH(yH ; H ;  (H ; yH))  EUH(by; !;  (!; by)) 8 by 6= yH ; ! 6= H (2.7)
(yH  NH)  c ((1  ) (L; yL) +  (H ; yH))  B (2.8)
(2.6) and (2.7) are the incentive compatibility constraints. 2.6) says that low-
income earners prefer reporting by = yL and choosing the conspicuous consumption
prole L over any other combination of an income report and consumption prole
given the governments schedule of audit probabilities. Analogously, (2.7) states that
high-income earners prefer reporting by = yH and choosing the conspicuous consump-
tion prole H over any other combination of an income report and consumption
prole given the resulting audit probabilities.
(2.8) is the governments budget constraint. Its tax authority collects income tax
yH  NH from citizens reporting the high income and incurs audit costs c > 0 when
auditing taxpayers. Without specifying in the model how the tax revenue is used,
we assume that the government has to meet a given revenue requirement B > 0, for
example to nance public goods. The lack of monetary penalties together with our
assumption that low-income earners are exempt from paying income taxes implies
that the government has to induce high-income earners to pay taxes truthfully 
otherwise it will not collect any revenue at all.32
To summarize, let us recall the timing of the income tax compliance game as
shown in Figure 2.1. In the rst stage of the game, each citizen privately observes
his income. In the second stage, for a given distribution of gross incomes, the
32Alternatively, we could have assumed that low-income earners also pay income taxes with
little change in results. However, this would require additional assumptions: if low-income earners
also pay income taxes, which they are unable to evade (recall that we have restricted the message
space), then the tax authority will only induce honesty for high-income earners if the revenue
requirement is su¢ ciently high, i.e., cannot be met otherwise.
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Figure 2.1: The timing of the tax compliance game
government commits to an audit schedule and o¤ers a menu of combinations of
an income report, a conspicuous consumption prole, and an audit probability. In
the third stage, each citizen les an income report, pays taxes if required and then
chooses his consumption. In the last stage, the tax authority audits according to
the audit probabilities specied by the government and caught tax evaders incur a
non-monetary utility loss.
2.3 Analysis
Having introduced the model framework in the previous section, we can now solve
for the governments optimal menu and audit schedule as well as for citizensbehav-
ioral response. Before we state the equilibrium result for this tax compliance game,
let us recall that, by assumption, we focus on a scenario in which the government
restricts itself to o¤er the e¢ cient conspicuous consumption prole in combination
with a low-income report. As has been shown above, due to citizenstaste for vari-
ety and because all prices are normalized to unity, rst-best consumption levels are
obtained by spreading the after-tax income evenly across conspicuous and incon-
spicuous goods. Also with tax evasion, the optimization problem and the after-tax
income of the low-income group is unchanged, such that their rst-best consump-
tion choice remains optimal. Thus, the level of conspicuous consumption o¤ered to
low-income earners is given by xL;i = xFBL;i = yL for all i 2 [0; h] collected in prole
L.
We can now state our rst equilibrium result in the following proposition:
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Proposition 2.1 Suppose that for any given set of parameters (yH ; yL; ; B) audit
costs c are su¢ ciently small such that NH > yL holds. (i) The government o¤ers a
menu consisting of two combinations of an income report, a conspicuous consump-
tion prole, and an audit probability, (yL; L;  (L; yL)) and (yH ; H ;  (H ; yH))
where H has xH;i = NH for all i 2 [0; h], and the government also commits to
audit probabilities  (!; yH) = 0 for all ! and  (!; yL) = 1 for all ! 6= L and
 (L; yL) given by
 (L; yL) =
1

"
h (yL)
 + (1  h)

yH   hyL
1  h
 1
 NH
#
, (2.9)
and NH given by
NH =
1
1  1

c

"
yH  
1

B   1

c


h (yL)
 + (1  h)

yH   hyL
1  h
 1#
. (2.10)
(ii) Citizens self-select such that low-income earners choose (yL; L;  (L; yL)) and
high-income earners choose (yH ; H ;  (H ; yH)), and consumption of inconspicuous
goods in both income groups is obtained by spreading net incomes evenly across goods
such that x!;l = N! for all l 2 [h; 1] with ! 2 fL;Hg.
Proof. We rst prove part (i). Recall that we have assumed that the government
o¤ers a combination of an income report, a conspicuous consumption prole, and an
audit probability for each group of citizens. Trivially, to induce honesty, the income
report included in each combination is given by by = yL for low-types and by = yH for
high-types. Thus, generally, the two combinations are given by (yL; L;  (L; yL))
and (yH ; H ;  (H ; yH)).
By assumption, low-types are o¤ered L with x!;i = x
FB
!;i = yL for all i 2
[0; h]. For high-types, given income is reported honestly, the consumption choice that
maximizes their consumption utility is to spread their budget evenly across all goods.
This is due to citizenstaste for variety and because all prices are normalized to unity.
In what follows, it will become clear that distorting honest high-typesconsumption
cannot be optimal because incentive compatibility would then imply higher audit
costs which in turn reduce welfare. Therefore the conspicuous consumption prole
o¤ered to high-types H has xH;i = NH for all i 2 [0; h].33
33Compared to the rst best, for the high-income group, net income will be lower when tax
evasion may occur because income tax payments need to be higher to nance audit costs. Regard-
less of this income e¤ect it remains optimal for high-income earners to spread their budget evenly
across conspicuous and inconspicuous goods if they report their income honestly.
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Let us now consider the audit schedule announced by the government. Recall
that the government cannot restrict citizenschoices of income reports and conspic-
uous consumption proles to the combinations included in the menu o¤ered by the
government. Hence, the government also announces audit probabilities for o¤-menu
choices.
Also recall that by assumption possible income reports are given by by 2 fyH ; yLg.
Low-income earners will always choose by = yL as taxpayers have no incentive to
overstate their income. If any citizen reports by = yH , the tax authority knows that
this must be a high-income earner. Hence, as auditing is costly the tax authority
will never audit a citizen who reports the high income regardless of the quantities
of conspicuous goods this citizens consumes, i.e.,  (!; yH) = 0 for all !.
Moreover, any conspicuous consumption prole ! 6= L observed jointly with
a low income report by = yL must be chosen by a high-income earner who underre-
ports his income to increase his after-tax budget. In contrast, a low-income earner
who honestly reports by = yL has no incentive to deviate from the prole L. Thus,
any taxpayer claiming to earn the low income who does not choose L will always
immediately be identied as evading taxes. A citizen who reports by = yL, but devi-
ates from the low-income earnersprole of conspicuous consumption for any single
good will be audited with certainty. The government commits to audit probabilities
 (!; yL) = 1 for all ! 6= L and high-income earners never choose such a reporting
and consumption behavior by (2.3).
Now consider the audit probability for citizens reporting by = yL and choosing L.
To determine the optimal probability  (L; yL), let us consider the governments
welfare maximization problem again. Constraint (2.6) never binds as low-income
earners cannot benet from choosing by 6= yL and ! 6= L. Consider constraint
(2.7): High-income earners do not benet from reporting by = yH resulting in net
income NH but choosing ! 6= H . However, a high-income earner may reportby = yL resulting in net income yH in order to increase his budget for consumption.
In this case, he has no incentive to choose ! 6= L as then he would be audited
with certainty, and by (2.3) he prefers to choose by = yH and ! = H over being
found evading taxes for sure. Hence, a high-income earner may only benet from
reporting by = yL if he also chooses L. Again, due to his taste for variety, the evader
then spreads the remaining budget yH hyL evenly across inconspicuous goods, such
that consumed quantities are given by
xE;l =
yH   hyL
1  h 8 l 2 [h; 1] . (2.11)
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Thus, the expected utility of a high-income earner reporting by = yL and choosing
L and xE;l for all l 2 [h; 1], EUH(yL; L;  (L; yL)), stated in terms of his expected
indirect utility, can be written as
EV evaderH =

h (yL)
 + (1  h)

yH   hyL
1  h
 1
   (L; yL) . (2.12)
Reconsider the incentive constraint for high-income earners in (2.7). We can now
state the relevant constraint as EUH(yH ; H ;  (H ; yH))  EUH(yL; L;  (L; yL))
and, equivalently, written in terms of expected indirect utilities
NH 

h (yL)
 + (1  h)

yH   hyL
1  h
 1
   (L; yL) . (2.13)
A high-income earner chooses to report his income honestly if this yields a weakly
higher (expected) indirect utility level.34
In equilibrium, the government sets  (L; yL) such that (2.13) is binding. To
show this, we rst solve (2.13) for  (L; yL) which yields
 (L; yL) 
1

"
h (yL)
 + (1  h)

yH   hyL
1  h
 1
 NH
#
 A. (2.14)
Expression A gives the ratio of a high-income earners utility gain from evading
without getting an audit (the term in squared brackets) and the utility loss from
being caught evading taxes (). Any audit probability  (L; yL)  A results in the
same gross tax revenue inducing high-income earners to report by = yH and consume
H , whereas for any  (L; yL) < A the governments budget constraint in (2.8) is
never satised.
Returning to conditions (2.3) and (2.4), we can show that A 2 [0; 1). From (2.4)
it follows that the term in squared brackets in (2.14) is indeed always positive. Next,
observe that due to citizenstaste for variety, imitating the conspicuous consumption
prole of low-income earners makes a tax evader worse o¤ compared to spreading
the same budget equally across all goods. Thus, condition (2.3) implies that
NH >

h (yL)
 + (1  h)

yH   hyL
1  h
 1
   = V evaderdetected. (2.15)
34In line with the literature, we assume that any high-income earner who is indi¤erent between
evading and reporting truthfully chooses honesty by assumption.
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Solving (2.15) for the non-monetary utility loss , shows that  is always larger
than the term in squared brackets in (2.14), i.e.,
 >

h (yL)
 + (1  h)

yH   hyL
1  h
 1
 NH .
Hence, the relationships in (2.3) and (2.4) ensure that A 2 [0; 1).
Plugging  (L; yL) = A into the governments budget constraint in (2.8) and
rearranging, we obtain the high-income earners net income NH as stated in (2.10).
Further, note that an honestly reporting high-income earners indirect utility V honestH =
NH is decreasing in the audit probability  (L; yL). To show this, we di¤erentiate
NH as stated in (2.10) with respect to  (L; yL) obtaining
@NH
@ (L; yL)
=  1

c < 0. (2.16)
If the government increases the audit probability  (L; yL), audit costs  (L; yL) c
go up and are equally shared among all honest high-income earners (whose share in
the population is ) decreasing their after tax income and, thus, welfare.35 Hence,
the welfare maximizing audit probability is given by  (L; yL) = A as in (2.9) which
ensures that constraints (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8) are satised: Whereas (2.6) always
holds, (2.7) and (2.8) are binding at the welfare optimum in which the government
sets its audit probabilities such that audit costs become minimal and high-income
earners are induced to pay taxes honestly.
For part (ii), it follows from part (i) that citizens select the combination the
government wanted them to choose. Regarding their consumption of inconspicuous
goods, as shown above, due to citizens taste for variety and because all prices
are normalized to unity, honestly reporting citizens maximize their consumption
utility by spreading their budget evenly across all goods. Hence, consumption of
inconspicuous goods is given by x!;l = N! for all l 2 [h; 1] with ! 2 fL;Hg.
Let us discuss some of our assumptions. First, the relationship in (2.4) may not
hold if the di¤erence between the two income levels yL and yH is very large and/
or if h is high, i.e., the range of conspicuous goods is very large. In this case, as by
(2.3) a tax evader seeks to avoid being audited with certainty but has to reduce his
consumption of conspicuous goods by too much and/or for a too large fraction of
goods, tax evasion is not benecial for a high-income earner. We analyze the e¤ect
of a change in h in more detail in Section 2.4.
35From (2.13) it follows that it cannot be optimal for the government to o¤er high-income earners
a prole other than H as this would decrease the left hand side of the incentive constraint, such
that a higher audit probability would be necessary to induce honesty and this would reduce welfare.
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Second, we have assumed that for a given set of parameters (yH ; yL; ; B) audit
costs c are su¢ ciently small such that NH > yL holds for the audit probabilities
and the resulting net income NH stated in Proposition 2.1. Clearly, this can only
hold for reasonable parameter constellations and may no longer be satised if audit
costs become too large. In this case, it becomes particularly relevant to reconsider
our assumption that low-income earners are o¤ered their e¢ cient conspicuous con-
sumption prole.
Also, even if audit costs are su¢ ciently small, the government may be able to
increase overall welfare by distorting the conspicuous consumption prole o¤ered
to low-income earners away from the e¢ cient prole. Specically, by lowering the
conspicuous consumption level of the low-income group o¤ering some prole L
with xL;i < xL;i for all i 2 [0; h], the government can make mimicking them less
attractive for the high-income group. In turn, the critical audit probability  (L; yL)
which induces high-income earners to report their income honestly can be lowered
compared to  (L; yL) in Proposition 2.1. This e¤ect reduces audit costs. However,
the overall impact on audit costs also depends on a second e¤ect: Note that a low-
income earner is worse o¤ in terms of consumption utility if he chooses L instead
of L.
36 For such a distorted prole L to be chosen by low-income earners, the
government therefore needs to commit to some probability with which it audits and
also punishes low-income earners who report their income honestly but deviate from
the consumption prole L. This results in additional audit costs.
Thus, a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for welfare to improve by moving
away from the low-income groups e¢ cient conspicuous consumption prole is that,
overall, audit costs indeed go down. Lower audit costs would then imply that the
governments budget constraint could be met by a lower income tax paid by the
high-income group. For welfare to increase, the utility gain accruing to the group of
high-income earners from having a higher net income at their disposal must exceed
the utility loss incurred by the group of low-income earners from distorting their
consumption choice.
2.4 Less privacy: conspicuity on the rise
As we have pointed out in Section 2.1, while people may share more information
about what they do and what they consume with their friends or followers in social
networks and on online platforms, new technologies become available not only to
36Due to their taste for variety, citizens prefer to spread their budget evenly across all goods.
If they reduce their consumption on [0; h] the resulting loss in utility exceeds the utility gain from
spending the freed-up money on [h; 1].
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taxpayers, but also to tax authorities. Hence, we nd an important research question
is to ask how the governments optimal policy outlined above changes as the fraction
of conspicuous goods increases.37 Looking at the comparative statics for a change in
h, i.e., the share of observable consumption, the following proposition answers this
question.
Proposition 2.2 Suppose the range of conspicuous consumption goods [0; h] in-
creases. This a¤ects the menu o¤ered by the government consisting of (yL; L;  (L; yL))
and (yH ; H ;  (H ; yH)) as follows:  (L; yL) decreases resulting in an increase in
NH ; consumption levels are still given by x!;i = x!;l = N! for all i 2 [0; h] and
l 2 [h; 1] with ! 2 fL;Hg, and audit probabilities  (!; yH) = 0 for all ! and
 (!; yL) = 1 for all ! 6= L are preserved.
Proof. First, audit probabilities  (!; yH) = 0 for all ! and  (!; yL) = 1 for
all ! 6= L remain unchanged as the reasoning in the proof of Proposition 2.1 is
una¤ected by an increase in h. Moreover, when h increases, as honest citizens prefer
to spread their budget equally across all goods, optimal consumption levels are still
dened by x!;i = x!;l = N! for all i 2 [0; h] and l 2 [h; 1] with ! 2 fL;Hg.
As has been shown above, a high-income earner reporting by = yL imitates the
conspicuous consumption prole of low-income earners to avoid a certain audit and
therefore chooses L and xE;l as in (2.11) for all l 2 [h; 1]. Note that before h
increased, the same allocation as after the change in h was feasible, but not chosen
by the citizen. Hence, the allocation chosen after the increase in h cannot make the
citizen better o¤. Also, note that the allocation chosen before h increased was a
global maximum as the evaders expected utility EU evaderH is strictly concave in xE;l
which can be seen from
@2EU evaderH
@ (xE;l)
2 = ((xL;i)
 h+ (xE;l)
 (1  h))
1 2
 (  1) (1  h) (xE;l) 2 (xL;i) h < 0
for all l 2 [h; 1] as  < 1. Hence, for a given audit probability  (L; yL), the
expected utility of an evader decreases in h, i.e., @EU evaderH =@h < 0.
Now, recall that the optimal audit probability  (L; yL) has been chosen such
that any high-income earner is just indi¤erent between reporting yH honestly and
evading (reporting yL and choosing L). Formally, 
 (L; yL) = A as in (2.14), such
that V honestH = EV
evader
H . Note that for a given audit probability 
 (L; yL) a change
in h leaves the utility of an honest high-income earner unchanged and only reduces
37Recall that, as mentioned in Section 2.1, we assume that taxpayers cannot a¤ect the size of
the share of observable consumption with their behavior.
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the expected utility of an evader. Also, note that the expected indirect utility of
an evader decreases in the audit probability, i.e., @EV evaderH =@ (L; yL) < 0. The
reason is that incurring the non-monetary loss  becomes more likely, as can be seen
from (2.12) in the proof of Proposition 2.1. If h increases making an evader worse o¤
in expected terms, the tax authority has to reduce its audit probability  (L; yL) to
make high-income earners indi¤erent between honesty and evasion again. Formally,
d (L; yL)
dh
< 0.
Lastly, as  (L; yL) decreases due to an increase in h, as a consequence NH
goes up which can be seen from (2.16) in the proof of Proposition 2.1.
Figure 2.2 depicts schematically how the tax evader adjusts his consumption
choice if consumption of more goods becomes observable. The dashed lines indi-
cate the consumption level chosen before h increased. The solid lines show the new
consumption level for goods, for which the consumption level changes due to the
increase in h. For those goods i 2 [h; h0], which have become observable, the con-
sumption level is reduced to the low-income types optimal level xL;i. This increases
the budget left for unobservable consumption which is thus increased to x0E;l for all
l 2 [h0; 1]. As it has been proven above, the increase in h makes an evader worse o¤,
i.e., his utility loss over the range of goods i 2 [h; h0] outweighs his utility gain over
the range of goods l 2 [h0; 1].
Figure 2.2: Schematic representation of the change in the tax evaders consumption
choice if the range of conspicuous goods increases
Let us now consider the optimal audit probability  (L; yL) for the two extreme
cases if consumption of goods is never observable and if consumption of all goods is
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observable. If consumption is not observable at all, we obtain
lim
h!0
 (L; yL) =
yH  NH

.
This expression is equivalent to the optimal audit probability in standard models
without conspicuous consumption if the low-income types are exempt from paying
income taxes and if  captures both the repayment of evaded taxes and the penalty
proportional to the amount of evaded taxes.
If the continuum of goods consists of conspicuous goods only, the optimal audit
probability for citizens reporting yL and choosing prole L is given by
lim
h!1
 (L; yL) = 0. (2.17)
If consumption of all goods is observable, any tax evader seeking to avoid a certain
audit would have to imitate the low-income types conspicuous consumption for all
i 2 [0; 1]. However, there are no inconspicuous goods on which he could spend the
evaded money which he did not spend on conspicuous goods as this would have
attracted the attention of the tax authority. In this case, with all goods being
conspicuous, tax evasion does not pay o¤, and the optimal audit probability will be
set to zero. Note that this relies on the assumption that audit cost are su¢ ciently
low such that NH > yL is satised, implying that a low-income types conspicuous
consumption is always lower compared to an honest high-income types. Under this
assumption, with h = 1, a high-income type has no reason to evade taxes and to
throw away the evaded money. Also note that even if indeed  (L; yL) = 0, any
taxpayer who reports the low income and does not imitate the low-income types
conspicuous consumption pattern is still audited with certainty.
As mentioned after Proposition 2.1, if not all but only a su¢ ciently large share
of consumption is observable, a high-income citizen may not nd it worthwhile to
distort his consumption allocation to imitate the low-income type. Hence, with a
su¢ ciently large h condition (2.4) may be violated and the critical h is the one
at which this condition holds with equality. For this critical h or an even larger
share of observable consumption, a high-income citizen always prefers paying his
taxes honestly over successfully evading taxes when imitating the low-income types
conspicuous consumption pattern. Thus, the audit probability for citizens reporting
the low income and choosing the low-income types conspicuous consumption pattern
will be set to zero. Figure 2.3 depicts the optimal audit probability  (L; yL) as a
function of the share h of conspicuous goods.
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Figure 2.3:  (L; yL) as a function of the share h of conspicuous goods
Note: For yL = 2, yH = 20,  = 0:7,  = 15, NH as dened in (2.10) with B = 3, c = 2,
 = 0:5.
We can now discuss how an increase in the range of conspicuous consumption
goods a¤ects welfare.
Corollary 2.3 Social welfare increases as the range of conspicuous consumption
goods [0; h] increases.
Note that in equilibrium all citizens pay their taxes honestly and that their
utility is not directly a¤ected by a change in h. However, as stated in Proposition
2.2, as h increases, the optimal audit probability  (L; yL) which is part of the
menu o¤ered by the government decreases. Thus, total audit costs  (L; yL) c go
down. Consequently, NH increases as lower income tax payments su¢ ce to raise the
revenue required to satisfy the governments budget constraint once citizens have
been induced to pay their taxes honestly. Hence, there is a welfare benet accruing
to high-income types who face a lower income tax burden. In other words, rst,
high-income earners as potential tax evaders su¤er if consumption of more goods
becomes observable, but then in equilibrium, i.e., once they choose to pay their taxes
truthfully, they benet from a higher net income.
2.5 A consumption tax on conspicuous goods
Throughout we assume that low-income earners do not have to pay income taxes.
However, in this section, we study a tax reform introducing a marginal consumption
tax on conspicuous goods which all citizens have to pay. Nevertheless, we can show
that such a tax reform yields a Pareto-improvement of welfare when appropriate
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refunds are included. Due to the refunds, this tax reform does not make low-income
earners (in fact, any honest taxpayer) worse o¤. Similarly to the e¤ect of a change in
privacy studied in the previous section, the tax reform a¤ects the incentive constraint
for high-income earners imitating the low-income earnersconspicuous consumption.
Consequently, the tax authority can reduce its audit probability for citizens reporting
the low income and choosing the corresponding consumption prole.
We will now describe the tax reform program and its e¤ects in detail. The
government introduces a small tax  on conspicuous consumption goods x!;i with
i 2 [0; h] and pays a lump-sum refund R to each citizen which equals the amount of
consumption taxes paid by this citizen in the absence of the refund. Before stating
the e¤ect of this tax reform on welfare, we describe how it a¤ects the menu described
in Proposition 2.1.
Recall that the government o¤ers a menu entailing two conspicuous consumption
proles and that citizens self-select such that low-income earners consume xL;i for all
i 2 [0; h] and high-income earners consume xH;i for all i 2 [0; h]. Now, consider the
tax on conspicuous goods. We assume that the consumption tax  cannot be evaded.
After the tax reform has been introduced, the consumer price on conspicuous goods
equals the producer price plus the consumption tax, pj = 1 +  , whereas the price
for inconspicuous goods remains unchanged, pk = 1. We denote by ~x!;i () for all
i 2 [0; h] with ! 2 fL;Hg the optimal levels of conspicuous consumption after
the consumption tax but before the refund has been introduced.38 From there we
can calculate the size of the refund. As the government o¤ers two conspicuous
consumption proles, it also o¤ers two corresponding refunds R! = h~x () with
! 2 fL;Hg which equal the total amount of consumption taxes (in the absence of
the refunds) to be paid by low- and high-income earners, respectively. We denote
the new levels of conspicuous consumption included in the governments menu as
functions of the consumption tax and the refund, i.e., as ~x!;i ( ; R!) for all i 2 [0; h]
which are collected in prole ~! with ! 2 fL;Hg.39 Thus, we can restate the
governments policy described in Proposition 2.1 as characterized by
(i) the two combinations (yL; ~L;  (~L; yL)) and (yH ; ~H ;  (~H ; yH)); citizens re-
porting yL receive refund RL and citizens reporting yH receive refund RH and
obtain net income NH which again follows residually from the governments
budget constraint,
38The exact quantities for the optimal consumption choices with consumption tax but without
refund, ~xL;i () and ~xH;i (), are given in Appendix A.2.
39Analogously, consumption of inconspicuous goods is denoted as ~x!;l ( ;R!) for all l 2 [h; 1]
with ! 2 fL;Hg. Again, the exact quantities are given in Appendix A.2..
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(ii) and audit probabilities  (!; yH) = 0 for all ! and  (!; yL) = 1 for all
! 6= ~L.
We can now state the e¤ect of the tax reform on the audit probability  (~L; yL)
for citizens reporting yL and choosing prole ~L and on welfare.
Proposition 2.4 A tax reform introducing a small tax  on conspicuous consump-
tion goods and lump-sum refunds which equal the amount of consumption taxes paid
by citizens in the absence of the refund, (i) reduces the optimal audit probability
for citizens reporting yL and choosing the corresponding conspicuous consumption
prole, and therefore (ii) is a Pareto-improvement of welfare.
Proof. To show (i), i.e., that  (~L; yL) <  (L; yL), we denote the indirect
utility of an honest high-income earner consuming ~xH;i ( ; RH) for all i 2 [0; h] and
~xH;l ( ; RH) for all l 2 [h; 1] by V honestH ( ; RH), and by V evaderundetected ( ; RL) the indirect
utility of an evading high-income earner (who is not audited) consuming ~xL;i ( ; RL)
for all i 2 [0; h] and ~xE;l ( ; RL) for all l 2 [h; 1].40
Recall that the optimal audit probability for citizens reporting yL and choos-
ing the corresponding conspicuous consumption prole is the one that makes high-
income earners just indi¤erent between honesty and evading, as has been shown in
the proof of Proposition 2.1. Solving this indi¤erence condition for the audit prob-
ability, the new optimal audit probability given the tax reform described above is
characterized by
 (~L; yL) =
1

 
V evaderundetected ( ; RL)  V honestH ( ; RH)

. (2.18)
We can also write this probability as  ( ; RL; RH). Because we are interested in
the e¤ect of introducing a new and small consumption tax  together with refunds
RL and RH on the optimal audit probability, we rst di¤erentiate this new audit
probability with respect to  and then evaluate this derivative at  = 0.41 We can
calculate this derivative42 as
d ( ; RL; RH)
d
=
1


dV evaderundetected ( ; RL)
d
  dV
honest
H ( ; RH)
d

40The indirect utility functions are stated in Appendix A.2..
41All the required derivatives referred to below are stated explicitly in Appendix A.2..
42Alternatively, we could write the same derivative as
d ( ;RL; RH)
d
=
@
@
+
@
@RL
dRL
d
+
@
@RH
dRH
d
.
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where
dV 
 ( ; R!)
d
=
@V 
 ( ; R!)
@
+
@V 
 ( ; R!)
@R!
dR!
d
with ! = L if 
 =evader and ! = H if 
 =honest. Evaluating at  = 0, we nd
that the optimal audit probability decreases due to the tax reform, i.e.,
d ( ; RL; RH)
d

=0
< 0.
This is because the tax reform reduces an evaders indirect utility, formally,
dV evaderundetected ( ; RL)
d

=0
< 0.
The refund compensates the tax evader for the income e¤ect of the consumption
tax. However, even when evaluating at  = 0, the consumption tax on conspicuous
goods reduces an evaderindirect utility, because he does not consume in his own
optimum as he imitates the observable consumption prole of a low-income earner.
In contrast, an honest taxpayers indirect utility remains una¤ected43, formally,
dV honestH ( ; RH)
d

=0
= 0.
Hence, after the tax reform the optimal audit probability for citizens reporting
yL and choosing the corresponding conspicuous consumption prole will be lower
to make a high-income citizen indi¤erent between evading and reporting honestly
again.
For (ii), note that, for a given audit probability, the tax reform does not a¤ect the
utility of honest citizens, as has just been shown. However, it follows from (i) that
after the tax reform total audit costs will be lower, i.e.,  (~L; yL) c < 
 (~L; yL) c.
Analogously to the argument in Section 2.4, lower income tax payments by high-
income earners now su¢ ce to raise the revenue required by the government. Hence,
as after-tax income NH goes up, there is a welfare benet accruing to high-income
types.
2.6 Heterogeneous disutility from detection
The audit policy derived in Section 2.3, implies that in equilibrium tax evasion does
not occur. As citizens in the low-income group are exempt from paying taxes, the
43The same holds for low-income citizens.
55
Conspicuous Consumption, Privacy and Optimal Auditing
governments revenue requirement can be only met by inducing high-income earners
to pay taxes honestly. That the governments audit policy makes all taxpayers
report their income honestly is certainly not observed in reality and due to our
model framework in which taxpayers di¤er only along one dimension, namely their
income, and in which the society consists of two income groups only. In particular,
we have also assumed that if tax evaders are detected, the size of the disutility they
incur in this case is the same across individuals. However, individuals may in fact
vary in the extent to which they su¤er from the same punishment. Reasons may be
di¤erences in personality or di¤erent circumstances, for example, the consequences
of their behavior for their family members may not a¤ect all tax evaders to the same
degree.
Thus, in this section, we allow tax evaders to di¤er in their privately observed
disutility from being detected and ask how this impacts the governments audit
policy and we also reconsider an increase in the range of conspicuous goods. Specif-
ically, suppose that there is an individual specic non-monetary loss  which is
uniformly distributed on

; 

with density f (). Taxpayers privately observe the
size of their individual disutility  together with their privately observed income at
the beginning of the game.
In what follows, we maintain the assumption that together with the low income
report the government o¤ers the e¢ cient consumption prole L. As before, in
combination with the high income report it is again optimal to o¤er the e¢ cient
consumption prole H , and to set the audit probability for taxpayers reporting the
high income to zero regardless of their consumption prole, i.e.,  (; yH) = 0.
In Section 2.3, we have shown that the government audits taxpayers with cer-
tainty if they report the low income but deviate from the low-income earnerscon-
spicuous consumption prole, i.e.,  (!; yL) = 1 for all ! 6= L. We keep this
property here and, thus, focus on the audit probability  (L; yL) for taxpayers re-
porting the low income and choosing the prole L.
Similar to our assumption in (2.3), we assume that even those tax evaders who
incur the smallest disutility from being punished always prefer honest reporting over
being audited with certainty when they spread their total budget yH equally across
all goods,
V honest = NH > yH   . (2.19)
Recall the governments budget constraint in (2.8). With heterogenous disu-
tilities from punishment, for the governments budget constraint to be satised
given the exogenous tax payment T , the revenue requirement B and audit costs
c, the government must induce at least some fraction of high-income earners to
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report their income honestly. Generally, the fraction of high-income earners that
may be evading in equilibrium depends on the audit probability  (L; yL) and
can be written as S ( (L; yL)) = S (). To compute this fraction, we recon-
sider the incentive constraint for high-income earners in the proof of Proposition
2.1 in Section 2.3. High-income earners of type ~ will report their income honestly if
EU~(yH ; H ;  (H ; yH))  EU~(yL; L;  (L; yL)). We denote the audit probability
for which type ~ is just indi¤erent between honesty and evading as ~ (L; yL), which
we state explicitly in Appendix A.3.
If the government audits with probability ~ (L; yL), all high-income earners
with  < ~ still underreport their income and choose the conspicuous consumption
prole L to avoid being audited with certainty. Thus, for ~ (L; yL) all high-income
earners of type  2
h
~; 
i
prefer reporting their income honestly, and those of type
 2
h
; ~
i
choose to evade. S (~) denotes the fraction of evading high-income
earners.
We can now state the governments budget constraint as
 (1  S (~))T   ((1  ) + S (~)) ~ (L; yL) c  B (2.20)
The rst term in (2.20) gives the tax payments made by those high-income earners
who have been induced to pay taxes honestly.  gives the share of high-income
earners in the society and from them the fraction 1 S (~) pays taxes honestly. The
second term in (2.20) states the governments audit costs from auditing all taxpayers
who report the low income and choose the conspicuous consumption prole L with
probability ~ (L; yL). As in Section 2.3, this includes the entire group of low-income
earners whose share in the society is (1  ). Additionally, from the group of high-
income earners the fraction S (~) is also audited.
Recall that we have shown in Section 2.3 that the government maximizes welfare
by choosing the smallest audit probability  (L; yL) that makes high-income earners
just indi¤erent between honesty and evasion. In this way, the governments budget
constraint is met and audit cost are kept as small as possible. In our model frame-
work the tax payment to be made by high-income earners is exogenously given but,
residually, if audit cost are kept as small as possible, the tax payment to be made by
high-income earners can then also be as low as possible. Here we now abstract from
this e¤ect and treat the tax payment T as strictly constant. With heterogenous
unobserved disutilities from punishment, a welfare maximizing government then
chooses the smallest audit probability ~ (L; yL) such that its budget constraint is
met because a su¢ ciently large fraction of high-income earners has been induced to
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pay taxes honestly. If the government audits with probability ~ (L; yL), all high-
income earners with  2
h
; ~
i
evade and, thus, incur the expected non-monetary
loss ~ (L; yL) . By choosing the smallest ~ (L; yL) such that the budget con-
straint in (2.20) holds with equality, the government minimizes taxpayersexpected
disutility from punishment.44 Expected welfare written in terms of indirect utilities
is therefore given by
W = (1  ) yL
+ S (~)
"
h (yL)
 + (1  h)

yH   hyL
1  h
 1
  ~ (L; yL)
R ~

f(z) dz
#
(2.21)
+  (1  S (~))NH .
The rst term in (2.21) gives the utility obtained by the low-income group that
consumes at its e¢ cient level spreading the whole budget yL equally across all goods.
From the group of high-income earners (of size ) the fraction S (~) including all
types with  2
h
; ~
i
reports the low income, chooses the conspicuous consumption
prole L, consumes inconspicuous goods as stated in (2.11), and incurs the loss
from being punished with probability ~ (L; yL); the expected utility of this group
is given by the term in squared brackets in (2.21). Lastly, from the group of high-
income earners the fraction (1  S (~)) pays taxes honestly spreading the whole
after-tax income NH equally across all goods.
We can now ask how a decrease in privacy, i.e., an increase in the range of con-
spicuous consumption [0; h], a¤ects the governments audit probability for taxpayers
reporting the low income and choosing prole L. It follows from the reasoning in
Section 2.4 that, for a given audit probability ~ (L; yL), taxpayers of type ~ who
previously were just indi¤erent between honesty and evasion are strictly better o¤
from reporting honestly once consumption of more goods became observable. With a
larger range of observable consumption, evading taxes by mimicking the low-income
earnersconsumption on this range becomes more costly. Consequently, the audit
probability ~ (L; yL) now su¢ ces to make taxpayers of type
ee with ee < ~ just in-
di¤erent between honesty and evasion such that for ~ (L; yL) the share of honestly
reporting high-income earners increases. As a result, the governments net revenue
increases and this is due to two e¤ects. First, gross revenue goes up because the
share of high-income earners who pay taxes is larger. Second, audit costs go down
44In parallel to Section 2.3, we assume here that for any given set of parameters
(yH ; yL; ; B; T; ; ) audit costs c are su¢ ciently small such that NH > yL.
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because the audit probability ~ (L; yL) is applied to a smaller group of evading
high-income earners.
As argued above, the government chooses the audit probability  (L; yL) such
that its net revenue equals the revenue requirement B. Once more goods became
observable, the government therefore reduces its audit probability until the budget
constraint in (2.20) holds with equality again. Thus, it sets some audit probability
̂ (L; yL) with ̂ (L; yL) < ~ (L; yL) which makes taxpayers of type ̂ with ̂ > ~
just indi¤erent between honesty and evasion. As a consequence, taxpayers of type
 2
h
~; ̂
i
switch from honest reporting to evasion and are, in expectation, strictly
better o¤. For all taxpayers of type  2
h
; ̂
i
a lower audit probability also
reduces the expected non-monetary loss to ̂ (L; yL) . Hence, a decrease in privacy
ultimately results in an increase in welfare due to the utility gain accruing to evading
high-income earners.
2.7 Discussion and conclusions
Inspired by real world examples of audit policies which sought to single out income
tax evaders more e¤ectively by targeting owners of luxury cars, yachts and swimming
pools, this chapter has studied the governments optimal audit policy when taxpayers
consume conspicuously. Taking income as exogenously given, we have assumed
a population consisting of two income groups, and that low-income earners are
exempt from paying income taxes. We have described the menu consisting of two
combinations of an income report, a conspicuous consumption prole and an audit
probability o¤ered by the government which maximizes welfare subject to incentive
constraints and its budget constraint. In addition, we have shown that any taxpayer
reporting the low income also chooses the observable consumption prole associated
with the low income report otherwise he will be audited for sure. In contrast,
any taxpayer reporting the high income will never get an audit irrespective of his
consumption choice.
Considering taxpayers to have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences we have been able to
show that as the share of conspicuous consumption increases, cheating on the tax-
man when ling their tax report becomes less attractive to high-income earners.
Intuitively, as more consumption becomes observable, evaders incur a larger disu-
tility from distorting their consumption choice away from their own optimum, and
at the same time, there are less inconspicuous goods left on which they could spend
the evaded money instead. In turn, the optimal audit probability for citizens re-
porting the low income and choosing the corresponding conspicuous consumption
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prole can be reduced. This saves audit costs. With unobserved heterogeneity in
taxpayerscost from being audited, as the share of conspicuous consumption goes
up, ceteris paribus the fraction of honestly reporting high-income earners increases.
Consequently, the audit probability can also be reduced to raise the same amount
of revenue for the government.
In line with previous research, we have assumed a xed cost per audit incurred by
the tax authority. It seems reasonable to consider consumption which is observable
to everyone to be also costlessly observed by the tax authority. However, one may
argue that as more consumption becomes observable, tax authorities require more
resources to evaluate this additional information. We have abstracted from this in
our analysis.
Furthermore, we have assumed that taxpayers cannot decide for themselves how
much of their consumption is indeed observable to a greater audience. Rather,
we think of the increase in conspicuous consumption to take place because new
technologies such as Google Earth become available to the tax authority, because
smart cards as mentioned in Section 2.1 are introduced or because legal provisions
are changed such that certain types of information, which tax authorities observed
before but were not allowed to use, can now be linked to income tax reports. Nev-
ertheless, these developments may be facilitated by the observed tendency to share
more information which once used to be private in social networks and on online
platforms.
As mentioned in Section 2.1, this chapter and Konrad (2010) follow a di¤erent
approach but study a similar information problem such that our results and those
in Konrad (2010) correspond in some respects, but diverge in others. Clearly, if
information on individualsobservable consumption is used by the government in
an optimal income tax problem as studied in Konrad (2010) or in an optimal au-
diting problem as has been considered here, taxpayers may have an incentive to
distort their consumption choice. With only two income groups, high-income indi-
viduals may choose to imitate low-income typesobservable consumption to decrease
their e¤ective tax payment. However, with an optimally determined audit policy,
high-income individuals may nevertheless be induced to pay taxes honestly. If ob-
servability increases, tax evaders have to distort their consumption by even more.
This is why welfare decreases in the pooling equilibrium identied in Konrad (2010).
In contrast, in our auditing problem this negative impact on evadersutility a¤ects
the incentive constraint for high-income individuals such that audit costs go down.
Thus, the governments budget constraint can be met by lower income tax payments
which implies a welfare benet accruing to high-income individuals.
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Moreover, in the auditing problem studied here, as explained in Section 2.4, if the
share of observable consumption is su¢ ciently high, high-income earners may not
nd it worth their while any more to mimic low-income earners. The government can
then reduce the relevant audit probability to zero. This corresponds to one of the two
separating equilibria in Konrad (2010) in which separation is costless as high-income
earners prefer not to pool with low-income earners such that both types consume at
rst-best level. In the alternative separating equilibrium in Konrad (2010), however,
low-income earners need to reduce their observable consumption below their rst-
best level in order to make it su¢ ciently unattractive for high-income earners to
pool with them, and who consequently choose their rst-best consumption plan. In
this case, low-income earners su¤er from the governments inability to commit itself
not to use information on observable consumption for tax purposes.
As discussed in Section 2.3, in our model a similar equilibrium in which ob-
servable consumption of low-income earners is distorted away from their rst best
consumption prole would require to incentivize them to indeed choose such a dis-
torted consumption prole. Thus, the government would have to commit to punish
low-income earners who reported their income honestly but did not choose the con-
sumption prole the government wants them to choose. This leads to additional
audit costs compared to the scenario in which low-income earners are always o¤ered
their e¢ cient consumption prole. In contrast, a lower audit probability su¢ ces to
induce high-income earners to pay taxes honestly because mimicking the low-income
earnersdistorted conspicuous consumption is more costly. The overall e¤ect on wel-
fare would then depend on whether audit costs indeed decrease such that the tax
payment by high-income types can be lowered and whether the resulting utility gain
accruing to the high-income group exceeds the low-income groups loss in utility
from distorting their consumption choice.
We have departed from the standard tax evasion framework in which caught
evaders pay back the evaded amount of taxes and an additional ne. Instead, we
have introduced a non-monetary utility loss incurred by anyone found evading taxes.
Analogously to a model in which caught evaders have to pay a ne and in which the
objective is to maximize net tax revenue, in our model it is optimal to increase the
audit probability for citizens reporting the low income and choosing the correspond-
ing consumption prole until high-income earners are indi¤erent between evading
and truthful reporting. With monetary penalties, up to this point net revenue in-
creases under the condition that audit costs are su¢ ciently low. In the framework
we have suggested, as the audit probability increases, more tax evaders incur the
non-monetary utility loss. However, in equilibrium, for the governments budget
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constraint to be met, the high-income group is made indi¤erent between paying
taxes honestly and evading. If tax evaders di¤er in their privately observed disutil-
ity from being detected, the government also chooses the smallest audit probability
for which its budget constraint is just satised because a su¢ ciently large share of
high-income earners has been induced to report their income honestly. At the same
time, this minimizes evadersexpected disutility from being audited.
We have dened welfare simply as the sum of taxpayersutilities. One may object
that honest taxpayersand tax evadersutilities should not be weighed equally. We
have not addressed this normative question, but instead studied how individuals
behave when they are faced with incentives provided by a tax compliance game.
Abstracting from status concerns, for the purpose of this chapter, conspicuous
and inconspicuous goods have been considered to di¤er only in their observability.
It seems reasonable to assume that the consumption tax introduced in Section 2.5
cannot be evaded. However, here the consumption tax has not aimed at raising
more revenue from a tax base which does not su¤er from evasion. Neither, it has
been motivated by any calls to tax luxury goods, which may be consumed rela-
tively more by high-income earners. The tax reform considered in our extension
combines a small consumption tax on conspicuous goods with a lump-sum refund
which equals the amount of consumption taxes paid by each taxpayer in the ab-
sence of this refund. Still, it has been shown that, similar to a decrease in privacy,
such a tax reform makes income tax evasion less attractive and, thus allows to re-
duce the audit probability for citizens reporting the low income and choosing the
corresponding conspicuous consumption prole. Consequently, audit costs decrease
and lower income tax payments su¢ ce to meet the governments budget constraint.
Hence, high-income earners benet from a higher net income. In other words, we
have described a tax reform, which rst and out o¤ equilibrium, makes income tax
evaders worse o¤ because they distort their consumption choice whereas the lump-
sum refund compensates them only for the income e¤ect of the consumption tax.
However, in equilibrium, i.e., once tax compliance has been achieved, high-income
earners face a lower overall tax burden.
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Chapter 3
Consumption Auditing of Income
Tax Evaders
3.1 Introduction
Lavish mansions, luxury yachts and cars these goods may be thought of as the most
obvious signals of prosperity attracting the attention of tax authorities.1 However,
classical conspicuous goods are no longer the only type of consumption that can be
readily observed by the taxman. This development is driven by new technologies
and a changing attitude towards privacy. People share information that used to
be private on Facebook and Twitter, posting and tweeting about their purchases,
holiday and business trips. In Greece, tax authorities used Google Earth to detect
swimming pools.2 Mobile and other forms of electronic payments certainly play a
key role here as they can be used to monitor taxpayerslifestyle and to check the
plausibility of tax reports.3 The reason for the advancement of digital payments
may be twofold: First of all, people may increasingly prefer new convenient, cashless
payment methods, and, at the same time, governments may actively discourage the
use of cash.4
1For example, in Italy owners of yachts and luxury cars were targeted. See Sirletti and Donovan
(2010), Ebhardt (2012), Moody (2012).
2See Smith (2010).
3In the United States, credit and debit card companies as well as providers of online payment
systems are required to report transaction data to the IRS (The Housing and Economic Recovery
Act of 2008). Several countries make use of indirect income measurement methods, which can
include obtaining card account data to evaluate lifestyle expenditures. For example, in a project
set up to detect assets located in tax havens, the Swedish Tax Agency obtained detailed information
on transactions involving international bank cards and assessed trade patterns to identify Swedish
residentials (OECD, 2006).
4Denecker et al. (2013) includes a variety of examples how countries seek to reduce the use of
cash. Most recently, India, where dependence on cash is very high, is taking measures to discourage
cash transactions and to promote card and digital payments (The Times of India, 2016). Tax policy
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Depending on the countries under consideration, a scenario in which all con-
sumption is observable to the taxman may not be a very distant future. In such a
scenario it may become very attractive for some governments to allow its tax author-
ity to use information on citizensconsumption to detect tax evaders. This may be
particularly the case if simply auditing income reports is ine¤ective. Thus, we ask
the following research questions: First, how do taxpayers respond if the government
resorts to what we refer to as consumption auditing? Second, how can a welfare
maximizing government use consumption audits to induce tax honesty? And, lastly,
what are the comparative statics properties of the governments optimal policy and
its welfare consequences?
To address these questions, we study a tax compliance game with two income
groups and exogenously given tax payments to be made by members of each group.
Taxpayers consume a continuum of goods and consumption of all goods is potentially
observable to the government. Taxpayers may have an incentive to misrepresent
their income and, by assumption, only auditing their income reports does not detect
tax evaders. However, the government commits to inspect citizensconsumption for
a certain number of goods; evaluating their consumption for all goods may be too
costly. The government also announces that, depending on the income reported by
a citizen, it expects to observe a certain consumption level for the inspected goods
and considers any observed deviation as an unambiguous evidence of tax evasion.
Consumption auditing may provide tax evaders with an incentive to distort their
consumption choice. However, choosing the number of inspected goods optimally,
the government may also incentivize all citizens to pay taxes honestly.
There is a large body of literature on tax compliance and extensive surveys can be
found in Andreoni et al. (1998) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002). Theoretical work
on optimal auditing that is most relevant here includes Reinganum andWilde (1985),
Scotchmer (1987) and Sánchez and Sobel (1993) which all share the assumption that
the government or tax authority can commit to certain audit probabilities before
taxpayers report their income.5 Similarly, in our framework, we also assume that the
government can commit to some audit rule before taxpayers le returns. Specically,
it commits to inspect a certain number of goods and to punish taxpayers whose
consumption for these goods deviates from some predened level.
may also be used to discourage the use of cash. For example, regarding expenses for renovations
Denmark allows for a deduction from the personal income tax if the services had been paid for by
card or bank transfer (Madzharova, n.d.).
5A second line of research on optimal auditing does not make this commitment assumption.
The most important contributions following this alternative approach are Reinganum and Wilde
(1986), Graetz, Reinganum, and Wilde (1986), and Erard and Feinstein (1994).
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Typically, in the optimal auditing literature mentioned above, audit probabilities
are a function of reported income. However, Scotchmer (1987) and Macho-Stadler
and Pérez-Castrillo (2002) take into account that tax authorities may condition au-
dit probabilities also on additional information about a taxpayers characteristics. In
Scotchmer (1987) this information is known to the taxpayer and may include char-
acteristics such as age or occupation. In Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (2002)
taxpayers do not know which kind of information the tax authority learns in addition
to the income report they le. In Scotchmer (1987) as well as in Macho-Stadler and
Pérez-Castrillo (2002), taxpayersbehavior does not change which additional infor-
mation the tax authority observes about them. Yet, as we suggest in this chapter,
how taxpayers choose their observable consumption does a¤ect what tax authorities
observe about them.
To date, few theoretical contributions have investigated the relationship between
taxpayersobservable consumption and their tax compliance behavior. Contributing
to the literature on optimal auditing, in Yaniv (2003), taxpayers are assumed to
consume a single observable good which comes in two types and the tax authority
chooses its optimal audit probability which is contingent on the type consumed.
In contrast, Yaniv (2013) follows the approach in the seminal paper Allingham
and Sandmo (1972) and accounts for taxpayersconspicuous consumption, which
is not only observable but may also provide some additional status utility.6 In
the model in Yaniv (2013), the exogenous audit probability decreases in reported
income and increases in conspicuous consumption. Also belonging to this line of
research, Levaggi and Menoncin (2015) is a working paper modelling the decision
of a representative consumer of how much of his income to declare, how much to
allocate to savings and consumption, respectively, and how to split his consumption
budget between a normal and a conspicuous good.
In our model, as in Levaggi and Menoncin (2015), a tax evader chooses his
consumption taking the e¤ect on his probability to be detected into account. In
our model, this incentive stems from the governments consumption auditing policy:
the government commits to inspect a given number of goods from the continuum of
observable goods and this number together with the tax evaders behavioral response
determines the tax evaders actual probability to be detected. We also study the
governments decision of how many goods it should optimally inspect. In Levaggi
and Menoncin (2015), by assumption, the overall audit probability is given by the
di¤erence between two components: The rst component is an exogenous audit
6See also Goerke (2013) which considers the role of relative consumption concerns for tax
compliance.
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probability una¤ected by the consumers behavior. The second component is given
by the di¤erence between what the government presumes the consumer to spend
on the conspicuous good and the consumers actual spending on the conspicuous
good. The smaller this second component is, the larger is the consumers overall
probability to be audited and detected. Levaggi and Menoncin do not analyze the
governments optimal policy but only consider the behavior of the representative
consumer given the structure of the audit probability the authors assumed.7
Whereas in this chapter we allow for a continuum of observable consumption
goods, the models in Konrad (2010) and in Chapter 2 consider scenarios in which
consumption of some goods is observable but unobservable for others. In the two-
period-signaling game in Konrad (2010), the government forms beliefs about a tax-
payers type based on his observable consumption. Consequently, a citizens income
tax payment due in the second period depends on his observable consumption in the
rst period. In a society consisting of two types, high-types may then have an in-
centive to mimic low-typesobservable consumption and low-types may also want to
distort their observable consumption downward to discourage high-types from mim-
icking them. Identifying these incentives to distort consumption choices, Konrad
highlights how the governments inability to commit itself to disregard taxpayers
observable consumption diminishes welfare as privacy decreases (and consumption
of more goods becomes observable).
Focussing on optimal auditing in a framework with two types, the model in
Chapter 2 allows for a continuum of consumption goods and assumes citizens to
exhibit Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. The government commits to audit probabilities
which depend on reported income and observable consumption. Taxpayers choose
how much they want to consume from each good, but whether this consumption
is observable or not is an exogenous inherent property of each good. As the gov-
ernment is assumed to take into account taxpayersconsumption of all observable
goods, tax evaders may want to distort their consumption over the whole range of
observable goods. However, the government can set its audit probabilities such that
all taxpayers are induced to pay taxes honestly.
In this chapter we consider a di¤erent auditing technology. Specically, we as-
sume that consumption of all goods is observable, but that the government only
selects some goods to evaluate taxpayerslifestyle given their reported income. As
a consequence, tax evaders may also have an incentive to distort their consumption,
yet, they may choose the range over which they distort their consumption. This
7Additionally, in contrast to a model with just a representative consumer, as we model a
tax compliance game with two income groups/types and observable consumption, a tax evaders
consumption decision involves considerations to mimic the consumption pattern of a certain type.
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range then depends on the number of goods the government commits to inspect. In
contrast to standard tax compliance games, we assume that caught tax evaders do
not have to pay a ne. Rather, detected evaders su¤er from a non-monetary loss
which may capture their disutility from being sent to prison or from public shaming.
We do not assume a monetary punishment as tax evaders may not be able to pay
any nes once they spent all their money on consumption.8
The governments auditing technology we assume in our model framework in-
volves sampling a certain number of goods to be inspected from the continuum of
goods taxpayers consume. Therefore another eld of research that is somewhat re-
lated, is the literature on acceptance sampling, which studies sampling problems in
the context of statistical quality control. From this extensive body of literature,
studies most relevant here, i.e., for the sampling procedure implied by the auditing
technology we assume here, are models with single sampling by attributes when the
acceptance number is zero.9 On the one hand, the sampling procedure in our model
may be described using concepts developed by the literature on acceptance sampling.
On the other hand, structurally, the models in this eld of research di¤er consider-
ably from our framework given the di¤erent context for which they have been set
up, although they share the general idea that a principal engages in sampling to
provide the right incentives to some agent.10
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we describe the framework
of the tax compliance game. In Section 3.3, we solve the model and analyze some
comparative statics properties. Section 3.4 discusses and concludes.
8Following an alternative approach with a dynamic setting, in the working paper Levaggi and
Menoncin (2015) mentioned above, the representative consumer is endowed with an initial stock of
capital which produces a certain amount of income in each period. If the representative consumer
is caught evading in a given period, he has to pay a ne.
9Single sampling by attributes refers to a scenario in which a sample from a given lot is taken
only once, and the focus of the inspection is on some discrete quality attribute of the items in the
sample. The lot is accepted if the number of non-conforming items does not exceed some predened
acceptance number. If the acceptance number is zero, the lot is only accepted if no defective items
were found in the inspected sample, and to set up such a sampling plan what remains to be chosen
is the sample size. Qin et al. (2015) includes a literature survey with a focus on single-sampling by
attributes when the acceptance number is zero. See also Starbird (1997), and for a comprehensive
review of the acceptance sampling literature see Schilling (1999) and Wetherill and Chiu (1975).
10In the acceptance sampling literature, the principal-agent-models use objective functions
which are clearly di¤erent from the objective of a welfare maximizing government which we analyze
here. Moreover, whereas we study an adverse selection problem in which the sample size is the key
instrument to provide incentives, acceptance sampling is concerned with moral hazard problems
and often the principal may use additional instruments to provide incentives, such as payments
conditional on the sampling outcome, penalties and rewards or damage cost sharing (e.g., Bushman
and Kanodia 1996, Starbird 2001).
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3.2 Model
Consider the following tax compliance game between a government and a population
of taxpayers consisting of two groups. Taxpayers earning income yH belong to the
high-income group of size  2 (0; 1), taxpayers in the low-income group of size 1 
earn income yL with yL < yH . Tax payments due for citizens in both groups are
exogenously given by T!, and net incomes by N! = y! T! with ! 2 fH;Lg. Quite
naturally, we assume that the net income of high-types exceeds the net income of
low-types, i.e., NH > NL.
Citizens use all their net income to nance their consumption. We assume a
continuum of consumption goods which we normalize to unity. Moreover, we assume
that consumption of all goods is observable and explain the consequences for the
tax compliance game further below. Also, consumer prices equal producer prices,
and are normalized to unity. We denote the amount consumed by type ! of good i
as x!;i and write the consumption prole of type ! as ! which collects x!;i for all
i 2 [0; 1].
We follow the approach developed in the literature on monopolistic competition
with a continuum of consumption goods which assumes additive preferences on the
part of consumers.11 Thus, we assume that citizens have additive preferences over
the continuum of goods such that overall utility from consumption for a taxpayer of
type ! is given by
C! (!) =
Z 1
0
u (x!;i) di (3.1)
where u (x!;i) gives the utility from consuming good x!;i, assuming that u () is
twice continuously di¤erentiable with @u (x!;i) =@x!;i > 0, @2u (x!;i) =@ (x!;i)
2 < 0,
u (0) = 0 and limx!;i!1 @u (x!;i) =@x!;i = 0. Citizens maximize their utility in (3.1)
subject to the budget constraint
N! =
Z 1
0
x!;i di. (3.2)
In the rst best with perfectly observable income, citizens prefer to spread their
budget evenly across all goods as prices are uniform. Hence, rst best consumption
is given by xFB!;i = N! for all i 2 [0; 1] with ! 2 fL;Hg; L and H denote the
corresponding rst best consumption prole of low-types and high-types, respec-
tively. The type of preferences we assume here implies that citizens have a taste
11Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) rst introduced the constant elasticity of substitution model of
monopolistic competition which later has been generalized, for example in Zhelobodko et al. (2012)
which uses additive preferences. See also Parenti et al. (2016) which contains a survey on the type
of preferences assumed in monopolistic competition models.
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for variety, i.e., they prefer to spread their budget over the whole range of goods.
With uniform prices, consumption levels are in fact identical for all goods.
Taxpayers have private information about their income and the government col-
lects tax payments based on taxpayersincome reports by 2 fyL; yHg.12 Taxpayers
who are caught evading taxes su¤er from a non-monetary loss  which is exogenously
given, nite and identical for all taxpayers. For example, detected tax evaders may
incur this loss because their misconduct is made public in a naming and shaming
program against tax evaders, or because they are sent to prison as they cannot pay
a ne or repay the evaded money after spending it all on consumption.
Let us now describe how tax evasion is actually detected. We assume that
auditing citizens income reports is insu¢ cient to detect evaders. However, the
government can use what we refer to as consumption audits. Consumption auditing
works as follows: The government announces and commits to inspect a certain
number of goods n = 1; 2; 3::: per citizen incurring audit costs c(n) with c0(n) > 0.
The government randomly draws these n consumption items from the continuum of
goods [0; 1] only once.13 Thus, citizens do not know which goods will be inspected,
and goods may also di¤er across taxpayers. However, the number of inspected goods
n is the same for all citizens. The government also announces that for a taxpayer
reporting income y! it considers any deviation from consumption level x!;i = x!;i
for all goods i which are among the n inspected goods as a clear indication of tax
evasion which will result in this taxpayer incurring the loss .
Generally, we can state the probability  that a tax evader is detected as a
function of the number of inspected goods and of his consumption prole, i.e., as
(n; !) which we explain in more detail below. For now, let us simply state that
with consumption auditing taxpayers may not only have an incentive to misrepresent
their income but also to distort their consumption choice.
The government uses all net tax revenue to nance a public good G. We nor-
malize the price of the public good to unity. We state the governments budget
constraint in Section 3.3.2 where we consider the optimization problem of a welfare
maximizing government. Note that citizens disregard the e¤ect of their own behav-
ior on the level of the public good provided by the government and therefore treat
G as a constant. Accounting for its marginal benet, citizens value the public good
at 1 +  > 1. We can now state citizensexpected utility: A citizen of type ! who
12We have restricted the message space by assumption. With only two income groups in the
population, any report other than yL or yH is not credible.
13In the language of the acceptance sampling literature, this is referred to as single sampling.
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reports income y! for a given number n of inspected goods obtains expected utility
EU! (y!;n) = C! (!)  (n; !) + (1 + )G, (3.3)
where the rst term gives his utility from private consumption of prole !, the
second term states that he incurs the non-monetary loss  with probability (n; !)
and the last term captures his utility from consuming the public goods G. We
analyze citizensbehavior in detail in Section 3.3.1.
Further, let us introduce some denitions and assumptions. We denote the net
income of high-types who make the low income tax payment asNE = yH TL . These
evading high-types may spread their net income NE equally across all goods. We
denote this consumption prole by E which has xE;i = NE for all i 2 [0; 1]. Suppose
that high-types reporting the low income and choosing E incur the non-monetary
loss  with certainty such that their utility from private consumption less costs from
being punished is given by CH (E)   . We make the following assumption on
high-typespreferences:
Assumption A1 High-types reporting the low income and choosing E are better
o¤ compared to choosing the consumption prole L, however they are also
worse o¤compared to reporting the high income and choosing the consumption
prole H . Thus,  satises
CH (H) > CH (E)   > CH (L) . (3.4)
To see the relevance of Assumption A1, suppose that the rst inequality in (3.4)
is violated because  is too small. In this case, there exists no n > 0 that could
induce honesty. Regardless of how many goods the government inspects, high-types
would always prefer to report the low income.14 Thus, Assumption A1 allows us
to focus on the case where there is a role for consumption auditing. The second
inequality in (3.4) is for simplicity and will become clear in Section 3.3.1.
Moreover, we assume the following:
Assumption A2 For the n inspected goods the government expects honestly re-
porting citizens to consume at rst best level, i.e., the government commits to
punish a citizen reporting income y! if he does not consume x!;i = N! with
! 2 fL;Hg for any of the n inspected goods.
14In Section 3.3.2, it will become clear that as auditing is costly and reduces the resources
which otherwise could be spent on the public good, if Assumption A1 was violated, welfare could
be improved by setting n = 0 to scrap audit costs altogether.
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Assumption A2 limits the governments choice set and implies that choosing the
number of goods to inspect for consumption auditing purposes remains the only
choice variable to induce tax honesty. For tax honesty to be implementable when
A2 holds, audit costs must be su¢ ciently low. We discuss the role of Assumption
A2 in more detail in Section 3.4.
Figure 3.1: The timing of the tax compliance game
We complete the description of the model by summarizing the timing of the
game as shown in Figure 3.1. First, taxpayers learn their type which is their private
information. Second, the government announces how many goods will be inspected
per citizen for auditing purposes and that citizens who are observed deviating from
the expected consumption level given their income report will be punished. Third,
taxpayers submit an income report, pay taxes accordingly and choose their con-
sumption. Lastly, tax auditing is carried out as announced by the government and
detected tax evaders su¤er from a non-monetary loss. We solve this tax compliance
game in the following section.
3.3 Analysis
To analyze the tax compliance game described above, in Section 3.3.1 we rst focus
on taxpayersbehavior for a given number of goods inspected by the government.
Recall that we assume that the government can commit to the number of goods
included in its consumption auditing. Thus, when taxpayers make their reporting
and consumption decision they take the policy announced by the government as
71
Consumption Auditing of Income Tax Evaders
given. In Section 3.3.2 we will then dene welfare and introduce the governments
optimization problem to study how many goods the government includes in its con-
sumption auditing in order to maximize welfare anticipating taxpayersbehavioral
response.
3.3.1 Taxpayersbehavior
At the third stage of the game taxpayers respond to the consumption auditing
policy announced by the government. Taking the number n of inspected goods as
given, they le an income report, pay their taxes and decide how much they want
to consume from each good in the continuum [0; 1]. This is described in our rst
proposition.
Proposition 3.1 (i) Low-types always report honestly, i.e., by = yL and choose
consumption prole L. (ii) Depending on the number of inspected goods, high-types
either report honestly by = yH and choose consumption prole H or they underreport,
i.e., by = yL, in which case they choose some optimal range of goods on which they
mimic low-types consumption and spread the remaining budget equally across all
other goods.
Proof. First, recall that, by assumption, we restricted the message space to by 2
fyH ; yLg. By A2, the government punishes citizens who report by = y! but deviate
from the consumption level x!;i = N! with ! 2 fL;Hg for a single inspected
good. To maximize their consumption utility, citizens of type ! who honestly report
income y! adopt this consumption level x!;i = N! for all i 2 [0; 1] and this choice
corresponds to the rst best consumption prole ! with ! 2 fL;Hg. Therefore
given honest reporting, low-types choose L and high-types choose H .
For (i), we now only need to consider low-types reporting decision. Clearly, for
low-types the optimal report is by = yL as they cannot underreport their income and
cannot benet from overstating it either.
For (ii), let us now consider high-typesconsumption choice given they reportedby = yL. Reporting the low income increases high-typesbudget for consumption
such that they have net income NE = yH   TL at their disposal. They know that
the government will inspect their consumption for n goods and punishes them if they
deviate from xL;i = NL for any of these goods. Therefore suppose that evading high-
types seek to avoid being detected with certainty and at the same time to benet
most from their increased budget by mimicking low-typesconsumption over some
range of goods and spreading the remaining money equally across all other goods.
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Hence, they may consider to consume xL;i = NL for all i 2 [0; h] and to consume
xE;i =
NE   hNL
1  h (3.5)
for all i 2 [h; 1]. For this consumption pattern, evading high-types essentially only
need to determine the range over which they may want to imitate low-typescon-
sumption, and we refer to this as their imitation level h 2 [0; 1].
Having introduced the imitation level h we can now reconsider the detection
probability for evading high-types and rewrite this probability as a function of the
number of inspected goods n and imitation level h, i.e., as (n; h). Given that
evading high-types may imitate low-typesconsumption xL;i = NL on [0; h], they
are immediately detected if the government inspects a single good on [h; 1].15 From
this observation it follows that the detection probability (n; h) can be computed
using the binomial distribution and is given by
(n; h) = 1 

n
0

(1  h)0hn
which simplies to (n; h) = 1  hn. Note that (n; h) is decreasing and concave in
h for n > 1 and linear for n = 1, and increasing and concave in n.
The expected utility of high-types reporting yL, choosing some imitation level h,
consuming xL;i = NL on [0; h] and xE;i as in (3.5) on [h; 1] for a given number n of
goods to be inspected is given by
EUH (yL; h;n) = hu (xL;i) + (1  h)u (xE;i)  (1  hn)  + (1 + )G. (3.6)
Any imitation level h 2 (0; 1)maximizing (3.6) must satisfy the rst order condition
@
@h
EUH (yL; h;n) = u (xL;i)  u (xE;i) + u0 (xE;i)
NE  NL
(1  h) + nh
n 1 (3.7)
where u0 (xE;i) = @u (xE;i) =@xE;i, and h = h(n) as the chosen imitation level de-
pends on the number of goods selected for auditing purposes, and the second order
15In the language of the acceptance sampling literature, here the acceptance number is zero.
That is, if for a single good in the inspected sample the taxpayer does not conform to the expected
consumption level, he is treated as an evader. In other words, to be considered as honest, there
must be zero defects in the governments sample.
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condition
@2
@ (h)2
EUH (yL; h
;n)

h
= u00 (xE;i(h
)) (NE  NL)
2
(1  h)3
+ n(n  1) (h)n 2  < 0
(3.8)
where u00 (xE;i()) = @2u (xE;i) =@ (xE;i)2.
The rst order condition requires that for some h the marginal benet (the
last term in (3.7)) from making detection less likely equals the marginal cost from
reducing the consumption utility due to mimicking low-typesconsumption on [0; h].
Regarding the second order condition in (3.8), observe that the rst term is always
negative due to the concavity of u(). The last term on the left hand side of the
inequality, however, is always positive for n > 1. Thus, for n > 1, for some h to be
a maximum, the marginal cost from mimicking must increase more strongly than
its marginal benet.
Note that there may exist multiple local maxima, i.e., multiple h 2 (0; 1) sat-
isfying (3.7) and (3.8). All local maxima are collected in the vector h, and this
vector may have a single or several elements.
For the corner solutions, note that h = 0 is equivalent to choosing the consump-
tion prole E and implies (n; 0) = 1. Conversely, choosing h = 1 avoids the loss
 altogether, i.e., (n; 1) = 0, by adopting the consumption level xL;i = NL for all
i 2 [0; 1] implying consumption prole L, but this choice leaves part of the budget
unused. By A1, h = 0 dominates h = 1.16
Given that high-types report yL, they choose the imitation level that maximizes
their expected utility. Thus, they either choose the corner solution h = 0 or they
choose some interior solution h if it exists, i.e., they choose among the local maxima
collected in h the one which is also a global maximum. Their expected utility is,
hence, given by
max fEUH (yL; 0;n) ; EUH (yL; h;n)g . (3.9)
We can now describe high-types reporting decision for a given number of in-
spected goods n > 0. Let us denote the expected utility of high-types who honestly
report yH and choose consumption prole H , i.e., an imitation level of zero, as
EUH (yH ; 0;n). If, for a given n, high-types reporting yL prefer the corner solution
h = 0, then by A1 they are better of reporting yH in which case they choose con-
sumption prole H . If, for a given n, high-types reporting yL prefer the interior
16Note that assuming the second inequality in Assumption A1 implies a clear ranking of the
two corner solutions, h! = 0 and h! = 1, for evading high-types. This simplies our argument,
but dropping this part of A1 does not change our results as evading and choosing either of the two
corner solutions is dominated by reporting honestly.
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solution h, then they will only report honestly instead if this makes them at least
weakly better o¤, i.e., if
EUH (yH ; 0;n)  EUH (yL; h;n) . (3.10)
Notice that also for some h ! 1, high-types are strictly better o¤ reporting yH
honestly and choosing prole H , which we show in Appendix B.1.
Proposition 3.1 shows that regardless of the governments consumption auditing,
low-types always report their income honestly and choose their rst best consump-
tion pattern. For high-types, however, how many goods the government commits
to inspect is critical. If high-types prefer honest reporting, they also choose their
rst best consumption pattern. If high-types underreport their income, they distort
their consumption pattern. They trade o¤ the advantage from reducing their de-
tection probability against the costs from distorting their consumption away from
their otherwise preferred pattern. We describe how the governments choice of the
number of inspected goods a¤ects evadersinterior solution for the imitation level
h 2 (0; 1) in Appendix B.2.
Figure 3.2: Schematic representation of evading high-typescost from partially mim-
icking low-typesconsumption
Figure 3.2 illustrates schematically how high-types distort their consumption
choice to reduce the probability to be detected by a consumption audit. As we have
shown in Proposition 3.1, high-types reporting by = yL choose their optimal imitation
level h 2 (0; 1), consume xL;i = NL on [0; h] and xE;i as in (3.5) on [h; 1]. These
evadersutility from private consumption hu (xL;i)+ (1  h)u (xE;i) is decreasing in
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h. Increasing imitation from h to h0, they incur a utility loss of size u (xL;i) u (xE;i)
from reducing consumption on the range [h; h0] to low-typesconsumption level, and,
spending the freed-up money by increasing consumption on the range [h0; 1], they
incur a utility gain of size u0 (xE;i)  ((NE  NL) = (1  h)). However, the utility
loss exceeds the utility gain, and the utility gain is also decreasing in h due to the
concavity of u(). Thus, mimicking low-typesconsumption is costly and increasingly
costly.
Before we turn to the governments optimal choice of how many goods to include
in its consumption auditing, we consider the comparative statics of high-typesex-
pected utility for a change in the number of inspected goods.
Corollary 3.2 High-typesexpected utility for h 2 (0; 1), EUH (yL; h;n), decreases
in n and their expected utility for h = 0 for both possible income reports, i.e.,
EUH (yH ; 0;n) and EUH (yL; 0;n), does not change in n.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
Moreover, observe that also for n!1, evading and mimicking high-types, who
obtain EUH (yL; h;n), are always worse o¤ compared to honest reporting, which
we show in Appendix B.4.
Figure 3.3 illustrates how the number of inspected goods a¤ects the utility of
high-types who report yL, choose some imitation level h such that they consume
xL;i = NL on [0; h] and xE;i as in (3.5) on [h; 1]. For this numerical example, tax-
payersutility from private consumption is represented by the square root utility
function. We drop their utility from the public good (which taxpayers regard as
a constant) and plot their expected utility EUH (yL; h;n) as a function of their
imitation level h for di¤erent values of n. As reference levels, we also include
high-typesutility from reporting yH and choosing H , and from reporting yL and
choosing the corner solutions, h = 0 and h = 1, respectively. Note that the order
of these three constant utility levels follows immediately from A1: As long as a
positive number of goods is inspected, EUH (yL; 0;n) =
p
NE    is always below
EUH (yH ; 0;n) =
p
NH . Mimicking low-typesconsumption for all goods, evading
high-types obtain EUH (yL; 1;n) =
p
NL, which is their worst option. As more
goods are inspected, the expected utility of high-types mimicking over some range
[0; h], EUH (yL; h;n) decreases and, eventually, once a su¢ cient number of goods is
inspected, evading and mimicking high-types are worse o¤compared to being honest
and choosing H .
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Figure 3.3: Numerical example with utility from private consumption represented
by the square root utility function
3.3.2 Governments optimal choice of n
In the previous section, we studied citizensbehavior for a given number of goods
inspected by the government. To analyze the governments choice of n, we will now
dene welfare in order to describe the governments optimization problem.
We dene expected welfare as the sum of taxpayersexpected utility which we
can state as
W = (1  )EUL (yL;n) + EUH (yH ;n) , (3.11)
again writing the expected utility of type ! who reports income y! for a given
number n of inspected goods as EU! (y!;n).17
The governments budget constraint is given by
(1  ) (yL  NL) +  (yH  NH)  c (n) +G (3.12)
which says that income tax payments yL NL and yH  NH collected from low- and
high-types, respectively, are used to nance audit costs c (n) and the provision of
the public good G.
17As we concentrate on the incentive e¤ects of the tax compliance game, we do not address the
normative question whether the utility of honest and evading taxpayers should be weighed equally.
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Before we state the governments optimization problem, let us introduce the
following assumption:
Assumption A3 Audit costs c (n) are su¢ ciently low such that inducing all citi-
zens to pay taxes honestly always increases welfare.
Recall that, by Assumption A2, citizens reporting income y! are punished if
 for the n inspected goods  they do not consume at the level x!;i = N! with
! 2 fL;Hg. As mentioned in Section 3.2, given Assumption A2 holds, audit costs
must be su¢ ciently low for tax honesty to be implementable. This is ensured by
Assumption A3 which implies that once honesty has been achieved the higher level
of gross tax revenue exceeds the potentially higher audit costs such that more of the
public good can be provided by the government. The gain in utility from the public
good then compensates for the potentially lower utility from private consumption
obtained by some type of taxpayer. We return to the discussion of Assumptions A2
and A3 in more detail in Section 3.4.
The governments optimization problem is then to choose the number n of goods
to be inspected maximizing (3.11) subject to its budget constraint in (3.12) and the
following incentive constraints for low- and high-types, respectively:
EUL (yL;n)  EUL (by;n) 8by (3.13)
EUH (yH ;n)  EUH (by;n) 8by (3.14)
(3.13) and (3.14) say that, for a given number of inspected goods for which low- and
high-types, respectively, have to consume at the announced level and are punished
otherwise, each type prefers to report his income honestly over reporting any other
income.
Anticipating taxpayers behavioral response as analyzed in Section 3.3.1, the
government determines the optimal number n of inspected goods at the second
stage of the tax compliance game. This is described in our second proposition.
Proposition 3.3 To maximize welfare, the government commits to inspect the small-
est positive number of goods n per citizen such that high-income earners at least
weakly prefer honest reporting.
Proof. Note that it follows immediately from Proposition 3.1 that the incentive
constraint for low-types in (3.13) is always satised. Regarding the incentive con-
straint for high-types from (3.14) above, recall from the proof of Proposition 3.1 that
if evading high-types prefer the corner solution h = 0, they are by Assumption A1
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always better o¤ reporting honestly as long as the government inspects a positive
number of goods. Thus, using the notation introduced in the proof of Proposition
3.1, we can restate the incentive constraint in (3.14) as
EUH (yH ; 0;n)  EUH (yL; h;n) (3.15)
where the left hand side states the expected utility of honest high-types choosing
prole H (an imitation level of h = 0) and the right hand side states the expected
utility of evading high-types choosing some interior solution h for their imitation
level. Further, recall from Corollary 3.2 that whereas EUH (yH ; 0;n) does not change
in n, EUH (yL; h;n) decreases in n.
To maximize welfare, the government chooses the smallest number n = n of
goods to be inspected such that (3.15) is satised. To see this, rst recall that, by
A3, we know that compared to the situation in which high-types report by = yL and
contribute tax payment TL welfare increases if high-types report by = yH and pay
TH because the costs of auditing which may be required to induce this behavior are
su¢ ciently small. The welfare gain from increased provision of the public good G
outweighs the potential loss in utility from private consumption obtained by high-
types.
Second, suppose that 0 < n < n such that (3.15) is violated and high-types
underreport their income and choose some interior solution h. In this case, by
A3 welfare could be improved by increasing n up to n such that EUH (yL; h;n)
decreases and (3.15) is satised.18
Now suppose the government sets n > n. In this case, (3.15) is satised and gross
tax revenue is the same as for n = n. However, it follows from the governments
budget constraint in (3.12) that, as audit costs c (n) increase in n, inspecting more
goods than n reduces the level of the public good G, which also reduces welfare
compared to n = n.
Lastly, recall from Section 3.3.1 that also for n ! 1, evading and mimicking
high-types are always worse o¤ compared to honest reporting.
Proposition 3.3 shows that, because audit costs are assumed to be su¢ ciently
low, the government maximizes welfare dened as the sum of taxpayersexpected
utility by inspecting as little goods as possible such that high-types are still induced
to pay taxes honestly. In the example depicted in Figure 3.3 in the previous section,
the government commits to inspect n = 4 goods to ensure that high-types report
their income honestly.
18Recall from the proof of Proposition 3.1 that also for h (n)! 1, high-types are always better
o¤ reporting yH honestly and choosing prole H .
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We can now state welfare for the optimally set number of goods n included in the
governments consumption auditing. Recall from Section 3.3.1 that honest taxpayers
adopt the consumption level x!;i, which they need to choose for the inspected goods
to avoid punishment, for all goods in the continuum [0; 1] because this consumption
pattern maximizes their utility from private consumption. Thus, they consume x!;i
for all i 2 [0; 1] with ! 2 fH;Lg. Consequently, in equilibrium, i.e., once the
government set the optimal number of inspected goods, welfare is given by
W = (1  )u (xL;i) + u(xH;i) + (1 + ) ((1  )TL + TH   c(n)) . (3.16)
Note that in (3.16) we made use of the governments budget constraint in (3.12)
which says that all net tax revenue is used to nance the public good. Note also
that the optimization problem maximizing welfare we study here is equivalent to an
approach that minimizes audit costs subject to the constraint that honesty needs to
be induced. To see this, observe that the number of inspected goods n a¤ects welfare
only through the resources available for public good provision.19 As the government
inspects the smallest possible number of goods subject to inducing honesty, audit
costs are kept at a minimum. In turn, the amount of the public good provided
becomes maximal and this benets both types of citizens. By Assumption A3 this
e¤ect always dominates the decrease in utility from private consumption which high-
types may su¤er as their net income decreases from NE when evading to NH once
they report their income truthfully.
Lastly, as discussed in the proof of Proposition 3.1, given they report the low
income yL, high-types may either prefer the corner solution with no mimicking or
they choose some interior imitation level. In the special case, in which evading
high-types always prefer the corner solution, consumption auditing becomes very
simple:
Corollary 3.4 If high-types reporting yL prefer the corner solution h = 0 for all
n > 0, the government selects a single good for consumption auditing, i.e., n = 1.
Proof. Follows immediately from the proof of Propositions 3.1 and 3.3.
In the following section, we will now consider some comparative statics prop-
erties. First, we will asks how changes in parameters of the model inuence the
governments optimally chosen number n of goods to be inspected. Second, we will
analyze how these changes in parameters a¤ect the equilibrium level of welfare.
19How many goods are inspected a¤ects the incentive constraint for high-types and, thus, the
amount of taxes collected from high-types, and it a¤ects audit costs c(n) incurred by the govern-
ment.
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3.3.3 Comparative statics
Turning now to the comparative statics properties of the optimal number of in-
spected goods, it follows immediately from the previous section that the incentive
constraint for high-types is key to understand the e¤ects of parameter changes on n.
Clearly, for the special case described in Corollary 3.4 in the previous section, the
optimal number of inspected goods n is una¤ected by changes in the parameters of
the model. In this case, as long as Assumption A1 on high-typespreference relation
remains valid, changes in the parameters do not a¤ect the incentive constraint for
high-types in a way that would call for a change in n. In the following, we therefore
consider the more general scenario in which the corner solution h = 0 does not dom-
inate the interior solution h 2 (0; 1) for all n > 0 and ask how changes in the set
of parameters (; yH ; yL; TH ; TL) alters the number of goods the government selects
for auditing purposes.
Corollary 3.5 The optimal number of inspected goods n is (i) non-increasing in
taxpayersutility loss  from being punished, (ii) non-decreasing in tax payment TH
and gross-income yL, and (iii) non-increasing in tax payment TL and gross-income
yH .
Proof. Recall from the proof of Proposition 3.3 that n is set by the government
such that the incentive constraint for high-types stated in (3.15) holds: They need
to be at least indi¤erent between reporting yH , in which case they choose H , and
reporting yL and choosing some interior imitation level h 2 (0; 1).
When (3.15) holds with equality at n, high-types, in case they would report yL,
strictly prefer the interior solution h 2 (0; 1) over the corner solution h = 0, which
follows from Assumption A1. Note, however, that due to the discrete nature of n,
(3.15) may be satised with strict inequality at n and in this case, given they would
report yL, high-types may either prefer the corner solution h = 0 or some interior
solution h 2 (0; 1).
Now for (i), note that as taxpayers utility loss  increases, in case evading
high-types do not mimic at all, their utility EUH (yL; 0; n) decreases more strongly
compared to the case in which they mimic low-types over some range of goods
incurring EUH (yL; h; n). The reason is that, in the rst case, they incur the loss
with certainty whereas, in the second case, they incur the loss only with some
probability (n; h) = 1   (h)n. In contrast, the left hand side of (3.15) remains
una¤ected. Thus, due to its discrete nature, n is either left unchanged or is decreased
if (3.15) became su¢ ciently slack.
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For (ii), rst suppose that the exogenous tax payment TH increases, but that As-
sumption A1 is still satised. Now the left hand side of (3.15) decreases whereas the
right hand side remains una¤ected and also EUH (yL; 0; n) is unchanged. Therefore
n is either left unchanged or has to be increased for (3.15) to be satised.
For the second part of (ii), note that an increase in gross-income yL increases
the expected utility of evading high-types only in case they choose some interior
imitation level: low-types consumption level xL;i = NL, which they imitate on
[0; h], increases and this yields them a utility gain which is larger compared to the
loss in utility on the range [h; 1] due to the lower consumption level xE;i as in (3.5).
As a result, n is either left unchanged or is increased such that (3.15) holds again.
For (iii), rst consider an increase in the exogenous tax payment TL. This a¤ects
the expected utility of evading high-types negatively, regardless of whether they
choose to mimic or not. This is because xL;i = NL and xE;i = NE decrease whereas
xE;i as in (3.5) increases. Note that for mimicking high-types the utility loss from
reducing their consumption on [0; h] even further exceeds the utility gain from in-
creasing consumption on [h; 1]. As the left hand side of (3.15) remains unchanged by
an increase in TL, n is either left unchanged or decreased if (3.15) became su¢ ciently
slack.
For the second part of (iii), suppose gross-income yH increases. Consequently,
the three consumption levels xH;i = NH , xE;i = NE and xE;i as in (3.5) increase.
Due to the concavity of u(), the utility of honest high-types on the left hand side of
(3.15) goes up most strongly and the utility in case evading high-types choose some
interior imitation level increases least strongly. Hence, n is either left unchanged or
is decreased if (3.15) became su¢ ciently slack.
If the number of goods that need to be inspected to induce tax honesty goes up
or down, this a¤ects audit costs, which then inuence the level of the public good
the government provides and, thus, welfare. We can now draw on the comparative
statics results for the optimal number of inspected goods stated in Corollary 3.5 to
ask how, once honesty has been induced, welfare as stated in (3.11) is a¤ected by
changes in the set of parameters (; yH ; yL; TH ; TL). This is described in the following
corollary.
Corollary 3.6 Welfare is (i) non-decreasing in taxpayersutility loss  from being
punished, and (ii) increasing in gross-income yH ; (iii) the e¤ect of changes in gross-
income yL and tax payments TH and TL on welfare is ambiguous.
Proof. Recall that audit costs c(n) increase in n which reduces the resources for
public good provision given honesty has already been induced. Then (i) follows
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immediately from part (i) of Corollary 3.5.20 Part (ii) then follows from part (iii)
of Corollary 3.5 implying that public good provision is non-decreasing and the fact
that high-typesutility from private consumption increases in gross-income yH .
For (iii), rst consider an increase in gross-income yL which by part (ii) of Corol-
lary 3.5 implies that provision of the public good is non-increasing. If public good
provision is unchanged, welfare goes up because low-typesutility from private con-
sumption goes up. If provision of the public good goes down, the overall e¤ect on
welfare is ambiguous and depends on the size of the low-income group (1  ), the
value (1 + ) citizens assign to the public good and how strongly low-typesutility
from private consumption increases compared to the decrease in the public good.
Now suppose that tax payment TH increases. It follows from part (ii) of Corollary
3.5 that provision of the public good can only increase if audit costs are unchanged
or increase less strongly compared to the increase in gross revenue collected from
high-types. As high-typesutility from private consumption decreases in TH , the
overall e¤ect on welfare is ambiguous.
Lastly, consider an increase in tax payment TL. It follows immediately from part
(iii) of Corollary 3.5 that provision of the public good is increasing in TL. However, as
low-typesutility from private consumption goes down, the overall e¤ect on welfare
is ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of these two opposing e¤ects and
on the size of the low-income group (1  ) and the value (1 + ) citizens assign to
the public good.
Note that here it is costless to increase taxpayersdisutility  from being punished
because, in equilibrium, citizens never actually incur this disutility. This corresponds
to the well known nding that tax evaders should be punished innitely harsh with
probability zero (see Becker 1968). But, as we mentioned before, we assume  to be
nite because punishment is typically bounded due to social and legal constraints.
Note also that we abstract from any costs the government may incur to ensure that
the disutility  is indeed credible, and these costs may be increasing in . Such costs
may be associated with running prisons or a naming and shaming program against
tax evaders.
As stated in Corollary 3.6 the comparative statics of welfare are ambiguous for
an increase in low-typesgross-income yL. However, the government may consider
taxing away this increase in yL by increasing the tax payment TL due for citizens
reporting the low income. Consequently, the impact of the change in yL and TL
on evading and mimicking high-types expected utility cancel and the number of
inspected goods can be left unchanged. As a consequence, public good provision
20Note that, in equilibrium, there are no citizens incurring the non-monetary loss .
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goes up as more tax revenue is collected from low-types whereas audit costs remain
unchanged. Thus, because utility from private consumption for both types remains
unchanged, the increase in the amount of the public good also unambiguously im-
proves the equilibrium welfare level.
3.4 Discussion and conclusions
In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we briey commented on our two important Assumptions A2
and A3. In the following, we return to this discussion and also consider a scenario
in which these assumptions are relaxed.
First of all, recall that Assumption A2 allowed us to restrict our attention to a
scenario in which the government commits not to punish taxpayers who are observed
consuming at the rst best consumption level that corresponds to their reported
income. Any taxpayer who, for the goods inspected by the government, is found
to deviate from this consumption level is treated as a tax evader and is therefore
punished. Clearly, Assumption A2 is restrictive as it limits the governments policy
instruments. To maximize welfare subject to the constraint that all taxpayers have
to report their income honestly, the government then only has to choose how many
goods to include in its consumption auditing. As increasing the number of goods
implies higher audit costs, maximizing welfare together with inducing tax honesty
is only feasible if audit costs become not too large. This is ensured by Assumption
A3.
Now, let us discuss the scenario when Assumptions A2 and A3 do not hold.
In this case, the government may commit to punish some type of citizen if this
type is observed to deviate from some prespecied consumption level which is below
the rst best level chosen by an honest citizen of this type. More precisely, the
government may commit to punish taxpayers reporting the low income who are
found deviating from some consumption level which is below low-typesrst best
level. Such a commitment may aim at making it less attractive for high-types to
mimic low-types.
In this scenario, there may be no distortion at the top such that taxpayers report-
ing the high income are still expected to consume at rst best level and are punished
if found doing otherwise. Clearly, an alternative commitment by the government
cannot make honest high-types better o¤. Making high-types worse o¤ likely im-
plies that incentive compatibility then requires to also make low-types worse o¤. It
is also clear that the government will commit to inspect a positive number of goods
as high-types would otherwise always report the low income.
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Considerations regarding low-types follow a similar reasoning as in the proof of
Proposition 3.1 regarding the behavior of evading and mimicking high-types. Sup-
pose the government commits to punish citizens reporting the low income who are
observed deviating from the prespecied consumption level which is below low-types
rst best. Low-types may then consider several options. First, they could adopt the
prespecied consumption level for all goods. In this case, they are never punished
but they also leave a part of their budget unused. Second, they could deviate from
the prespecied consumption level and choose their rst best consumption level for
all goods in which case they are punished with certainty and incur the non-monetary
loss  for sure.
Third, low-types could decide to conform to the prespecied consumption level
over some range of goods [0; hL] and spread the remaining budget equally across all
other goods on [hL; 1]. For this consumption pattern, they then only need to decide
on their conformation level hL. To this end, they trade o¤ the advantage from
reducing the probability of being punished against the disadvantage from distorting
their consumption pattern. Which option low-types prefer depends on the size of the
non-monetary loss , the number of goods inspected by the government and the size
of the loss in utility from private consumption from conforming to the prespecied
consumption level for some or all goods.21
To maximize welfare subject to the constraint to induce tax honesty, the gov-
ernment has to choose the number of inspected goods and, for these goods, the
consumption level taxpayers reporting the low income need to conform to in order
to avoid punishment in such a way, that at the same time (i) makes mimicking low-
types su¢ ciently unattractive for high-types, (ii) maximizes low-typesutility from
consumption, and (iii) minimizes the costs from consumption auditing in terms of
audit costs c (n) but also in terms of low-typesexpected disutility from punishment.
This may be achieved by a variety of combinations consisting of a consumption level
expected in combination with a low income report and the number of inspected
goods. For each combination, the relevant incentive constraints di¤er: evading and
mimicking high-types may choose a di¤erent imitation level for each combination;
analogously, low-types may choose a di¤erent conformation level for each combina-
tion.
Note that in such a scenario, when low-types not conform to the governments
expectation for all goods, in equilibrium, there are low-types being punished. Thus,
low-types would have to su¤er from the non-monetary loss  although they paid taxes
honestly, but failed to conform to the consumption level the government wanted
21Clearly, low-types never prefer to mimic high-types.
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them to choose at least for inspected goods. In contrast, our Assumption A2 implies
that low-types are never punished in equilibrium.
Although we have assumed that tax payments TL and TH to be made by low-
and high-types, respectively, are no choice variables of the government, note that
simply increasing TL may serve the same purpose as the more complicated policy
described above when Assumptions A2 and A3 are relaxed. Reducing low-typesnet
income lowers the consumption level they would choose to maximize their utility
from private consumption. This makes it less attractive for high-types to mimic
low-types and may reduce audit costs as has been shown in Corollary 3.5.
To conclude, let us reemphasize the main arguments of this chapter. As was
pointed out in Section 3.1, checking taxpayersconsumption to question the plausi-
bility of their reported income may become increasingly attractive to tax authorities
as they gain access to previously unavailable information. For one thing, taxpayers
share more information on online platforms and this certainly includes consumption
choices they make. For another thing, taxpayers use mobile and other electronic
payment methods which may ultimately become ubiquitous as cashless transactions
become increasingly safe and convenient. Meanwhile, governments also take actions
to reduce the use of cash and to reinforce the trend toward digital payments. Si-
multaneously, linking and processing large amounts of data becomes more and more
feasible. Against the backdrop of these developments, this chapter has suggested a
scenario in which all consumption is observable to the government.
The present study was designed to analyze the incentives at play in a tax com-
pliance game when taxpayers consume a continuum of observable goods and the
governments approach to single out tax evaders is to inspect a certain number of
goods to evaluate a taxpayers lifestyle given his income report. Similar to previous
research on optimal auditing when the government commits to some audit policy
contingent on reported income, here the government also commits to some audit pol-
icy consisting of (i) the number of inspected goods and, (ii) taxpayersconsumption
level which has to be observed for the inspected goods jointly with a given income re-
port to avoid a certain punishment. However, in our model, how a taxpayer chooses
to consume a¤ects his actual detection probability. This is because, as we have
shown in a framework with two income groups, evading high-types may consume
as low-types do, and high-types choose the optimal range of goods for which they
mimic low-types. The size of this range depends on the number of goods the gov-
ernment has committed itself to inspect. Because the government draws randomly
from the whole continuum of goods, tax evaders do not know which goods will end
up in the governments sample. Evaders go undetected if the government happens
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to only sample goods for which they mimic low-typesconsumption choice. In con-
trast, if the government draws a single good from the range where an evader chose
not to distort his consumption choice, he is immediately detected. We have shown
that, when tax evaders determine their mimicking range, they trade o¤ the benet
from reducing their detection probability against the cost from distorting their con-
sumption choice. In other words, after the government announces how many goods
it will inspect for auditing purposes, tax evaders choose their consumption pattern
and this ultimately determines the detection probability they actually face.
We have taken into account that, although information on taxpayersconsump-
tion may be readily available to tax authorities, actually using this information is
costly. Specically, audit costs increase with each additional good the tax author-
ity inspects. When audit costs go up but gross tax revenue remains unchanged,
there are less resources for the government to be spent on the public good. Hence,
for a welfare maximizing government, we have shown that it is optimal to inspect
the smallest number of goods such that high-income earners at least weakly prefer
reporting their income honestly.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 The constrained optimization problem
The st-best constrained optimization problem for citizensconsumption choice in
Section 2.2 can be solved with the Lagrangian
L = U!   
Z h
0
x!;j dj +
Z 1
h
x!;k dk  N!

where  is the Lagrange multiplier. The rst-order conditions are given by
@L
@x!;i
=
Z h
0
(x!;j)
 dj +
Z 1
h
(x!;k)
 dk
 1

 1
(x!;i)
 1   x!;i = 0 8 i 2 [0; h]
and
@L
@x!;l
=
Z h
0
(x!;j)
 dj +
Z 1
h
(x!;k)
 dk
 1

 1
(x!;l)
 1   x!;l = 0 8 l 2 [h; 1] .
A.2 The e¤ects of a tax reform introducing a con-
sumption tax and lump-sum refunds
In the absence of the lump-sum refund, but when the consumption tax  on con-
spicuous goods has been introduced, optimal consumption levels are given by
~xH;i () =
NH
h (1 + ) + (1  h) (1 + ) 8 i 2 [0; h]
and
~xH;l () =
NH
h (1 + )1  + (1  h)
8 l 2 [h; 1]
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for honest high-income citizens, and by
~xL;i () =
yL
h (1 + ) + (1  h) (1 + ) 8 i 2 [0; h] ,
~xL;l () =
yL
h (1 + )1  + (1  h)
8 l 2 [h; 1]
and
~xE;l () =
yH   h (1 + ) ~xL;i ()
(1  h) 8 l 2 [h; 1]
for low-income citizens and tax evaders, respectively.
When the lump-sum refund and the consumption tax have been introduced,
optimal consumption levels are given by
~xH;i ( ; RH) =
NH +RH
h (1 + ) + (1  h) (1 + ) 8 i 2 [0; h]
and
~xH;l ( ; RH) =
NH +RH
h (1 + )1  + (1  h)
8 l 2 [h; 1]
for honest high-income citizens, and by
~xL;i ( ; RL) =
yL +RL
h (1 + ) + (1  h) (1 + ) 8 i 2 [0; h] ,
~xL;l ( ; RL) =
yL +RL
h (1 + )1  + (1  h)
8 l 2 [h; 1]
and
~xE;l ( ; RL) =
yH +RL   h (1 + ) ~xL;i ( ; RL)
(1  h) 8 l 2 [h; 1]
for low-income citizens and tax evaders, respectively.
With these consumption quantities, the indirect utility functions used in (2.18)
are given by
V honestH ( ; RH) = (h (~xH;i ( ; RH))
 + (1  h) (~xH;l ( ; RH)))
1

for honest high-income citizens, and by
V evaderundetected ( ; RL) = (h (~xL;i ( ; RL))
 + (1  h) (~xE;l ( ; RL)))
1

for tax evaders, respectively.
To see why the tax reform program does not a¤ect the indirect utility of an
honest (high-income) citizen, rst, note that the refund compensates him for the
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income e¤ect of the consumption tax. Second, as he consumes in his own optimum
(in contrast to an evader), by the envelope theorem, we do not have to take the
indirect e¤ect of the consumption tax on the taxpayers indirect utility via changes
in the chosen quantities of consumption goods into account.
The derivative of the evaderss indirect utility function with respect to  is given
by
dV evaderundetected ( ; RL)
d
= (h (~xL;i ( ; RL))
 + (1  h) (~xE;l ( ; RL)))
1

 1


h (~xL;i ( ; RL))
 1 @~xL;i ( ; RL ())
@
+ (1  h) (~xE;l ( ; RL)) 1
@~xE;l ( ; RL ())
@

with
@~xL;i ( ; RL ())
@
=  
yL
 
h+ (1  h) (1 + ) 1

(h (1 + ) + (1  h) (1 + ))2
+
hyL
(h (1 + ) + (1  h) (1 + ))2
 
hyL2 (h (1 + ) + (1  h) (1 + ))
 
h+ (1  h) (1 + ) 1

(h (1 + ) + (1  h) (1 + ))4
and
@~xE;l ( ; RL ())
@
=
hyL
(h+ h+ (1 + )   (1 + ) h)3

 
(1 + )2 1  (1  h) + (1 + ) 1 h (2 + 1 + 3)  2h (1 + )

Evaluating the derivative of the evaderss indirect utility at  = 0 yields
dV evaderundetected ( ; RL)
d

=0
=

h (yL)
 + (1  h)

(yH   hyL)
(1  h)
 1 1
(1  h) (hyL)

 
  (yL) 1 +

(yH   hyL)
(1  h)
 1!
| {z }
( )
< 0.
A.3 The audit probability making type ~ indi¤er-
ent between honesty and evading
As stated in Section 2.6, high-income earners of type ~ report their income honestly
if EU~(yH ; H ;  (H ; yH))  EU~(yL; L;  (L; yL)). Equivalently, we can write the
incentive constraint for high-income earners of type ~ in terms of expected indirect
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utilities as
NH 

h (yL)
 + (1  h)

yH   hyL
1  h
 1
   (L; yL) ~. (A.1)
From (A.1) we obtain the audit probability ~ (L; yL) for which type ~ is just indif-
ferent between honesty and evading which is given by
~ (L; yL) =
1
~
"
h (yL)
 + (1  h)

yH   hyL
1  h
 1
 NH
#
.
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B.1 High-types are strictly better o¤reporting yH
honestly and choosing prole H for h ! 1
Consider the expected utility of high-types reporting yL, choosing some imitation
level h, consuming xL;i = NL on [0; h] and xE;i as in (3.5) on [h; 1] for a given
number n of goods to be inspected for the limiting case when h ! 1.
Note that as h ! 1, the consumption level xE;i dened in (3.5) is given by
lim
h!1
xE;i =1. (B.1)
For h ! 1, evading high-typesexpected utility as stated in (3.6) becomes
lim
h!1
EUH (yL; h
;n) = u (xL;i) + u
0 (1) (NE  NL) + (1 + )G (B.2)
= u (xL;i) + (1 + )G
where we made use of (B.1), applied LHôpitals rule, and in the second line of (B.2)
also made use of the assumption on u () that limx!;i!1 @u (x!;i) =@x!;i = 0.
Clearly, for h ! 1, high-types prefer reporting yH and choosing consumption
prole H because
EUH (yH ; 0;n) = u (xH;i) + (1 + )G > u (xL;i) + (1 + )G
as xH;i = NH > NL = xL;i.
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B.2 E¤ect of the number of inspected goods on
evaders interior solution for imitation level
h
It has been shown in the proof of Proposition 3.1 that, given high-types chose to
report the low income and to mimic low-types consumption over some range of
goods, their imitation level h 2 (0; 1) is determined by the rst order condition in
(3.7) which we restate here:
@
@h
EUH (yL; h;n) = u (xL;i)  u (xE;i) + u0 (xE;i)
NE  NL
(1  h) + nh
n 1. (B.3)
The number of inspected goods n a¤ects evading high-typesmarginal benet
from mimicking which is the last term in (B.3). In contrast, their marginal cost from
mimicking is una¤ected by n. Using the implicit function theorem, we can state the
e¤ect of n on h as
dh(n)
dn
=  
@2
@h@n
EUH (yL; h
(n);n)
@2
@(h)2
EUH (yL; h(n);n)
. (B.4)
Note that the denominator in (B.4) is the second order condition and must be
negative for a maximum at h. Hence, the sign of (B.4) is determined by the sign of
its numerator which we obtain by di¤erentiating the rst order condition in (B.3)
with respect to n:
@2
@h@n
EUH (yL; h
(n);n) = (h)n 1  (1 + n ln(h)) . (B.5)
As h 2 (0; 1), ln(h) < 0 and @2EUH (yL; h(n);n) =@h@n > 0 for n <  1= ln(h),
or, equivalently, for h > e
 1
n . Thus, whether, for a given n, the optimal imitation
level exceeds some critical threshold determines whether the imitation level will
increase or decrease as more goods are inspected.
Note that how a change in n a¤ects the marginal benet from mimicking es-
sentially depends on how n a¤ects @(n; h)=@h, which may be referred to as the
marginal productivity of the evasion technology used by evading high-types. As long
as n remains below the critical threshold value, increasing the number of inspected
goods also increases the marginal productivity of the evasion technology and, thus,
the marginal benet from mimicking. To balance the marginal benet and marginal
cost from mimicking after n went up, evading high-types increase the imitation level
h which again increases the marginal benet, but increases its marginal cost even
stronger as can be seen from the second order condition in (3.8).
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B.3 Proof of Corollary 3.2
It can be directly observed that honest high-typesexpected utility from choosing
H with xH;i = NH ,
EUH (yH ; 0;n) = u (xH;i) + (1 + )G,
does not change in the number n of goods inspected. Similarly, it can be directly
observed, that evading high-typesexpected utility from choosing the corner solution
h = 0,
EUH (yL; 0;n) = u (xE;i)   + (1 + )G, (B.6)
is not a¤ected by n.
To see that evading high-typesexpected utility from choosing the interior solu-
tion, EUH (yL; h;n), decreases in n, note that for any n1, n2 with n1 < n2 for any
given h 2 (0; 1) it holds that
EUH (yL; h;n1) > EUH (yL; h;n2) 8h, (B.7)
or, equivalently, and dropping the utility from the public good G on each side of the
inequality as taxpayers consider G as a constant,
hu (xL;i) + (1  h)u (xE;i)  (1  hn1)  >
hu (xL;i) + (1  h)u (xE;i)  (1  hn2)  8h
as hn1 > hn2 because 0 < h < 1. As (B.7) holds for any given h 2 (0; 1) it must also
be true that, writing h1 = argmaxh2(0;1)EUH (yL; h;n1),
EUH (yL; h

1;n1) > EUH (yL; h;n2) 8h,
which then also implies that
EUH (yL; h

1;n1) > EUH (yL; h

2;n2)
where h2 = argmaxh2(0;1)EUH (yL; h;n2).
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B.4 For n!1 evading and mimicking high-types
are always worse o¤ compared to honest re-
porting
Note that for any given h 2 (0; 1) as n ! 1 the expected utility of evading and
mimicking high-types is given by
lim
n!1
EUH (yL; h;n) = hu (xL;i) + (1  h)u (xE;i)   + (1 + )G. (B.8)
For this limiting case, they are always worse o¤ compared to reporting honestly as
EUH (yH ; 0;n) > EUH (yL; 0;n) > lim
n!1
EUH (yL; h;n)
where the rst inequality follows from A1 and the second inequality follows imme-
diately from comparing (B.6) and (B.8).
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